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"One of the rocket soldiers said that a 'special new weapon' would be fired that evening around 8:00 PM, and the crews were unsure if the ground was firm enough to support the weapon. The soldiers told us we should leave our home because there was a possibility the weapon might topple over and explode, destroying nearby houses."

"Mother did not believe this, but at exactly 8:00 PM there was a thump and roar of the rocket coming to life. I thought my lungs would blow apart. Mother ran to the window in time to see the rocket rise over our home. The noise from the engine stopped and few seconds later the rocket went down on the west dune at Scheveningen."

Den Haag resident Rita Winter

  Because of the sweeping Allied advances just weeks earlier, many Dutchmen in the province of South Holland believed the war would be over before Christmas of 1944. On September 5, 1944, there were many rumors about the fast-approaching Allied armies. However, the citizens were unaware of the overextended supply lines slowing the advance, which would soon become a crawl. Although they had grown accustomed to the sights and sounds of war, the Dutch were about to face another trepidation. Their suffering would not end soon.

   It had been a warm, sunny afternoon in the affluent suburb of Wassenaar, just northeast of The Hague (Den Haag). On that day, September 8, 1944, the citizens heard a different kind of sound. A tremendous roar filled the air, furniture and windowpanes shook, and the ground began vibrating. Dutch civilians exited their homes in time to witness two pointed projectiles, about 50 feet long, rising slowly above the treetops. A cloud of smoke rolled through the streets after the rockets had cleared the trees. They gained speed rapidly with flames emerging at the rear extending to more than half their lengths. As the rockets moved higher and higher into the heavens, a white trail appeared in the form of a spiral. The smoke disappeared at a height of about 12 miles, and the projectiles accelerated rapidly, their trajectory flattening out somewhat. They finally disappeared traveling at a terrific speed.

   Under the command of Colonel Hohmann, platoons from the second battery of Artillery Battalion 485 (2./485) had launched two rockets simultaneously at 6:36 PM from the picturesque neighborhood streets: one from the intersection of Lijsterlaan, Konijnenlaan, and Koekoekslaan; the other, about 150 feet away, from the intersection of Schouwweg and Rust en Vreugdlaan.

   Mr. C. van Fliet lived in Wassenaar. He remembered those first missiles. I heard a terrific noise as though 30 aircraft were flying low overhead, a noise such as I had never heard. I looked up to see two pointed projectiles, about 10 meters long, rising slowly above the treetops. A cloud of smoke billowed slowly after reaching a height of about 15 meters. The projectiles gained speed rapidly with a flame emerging at the rear extending to more than half their lengths. Van Fliet recalled that, the thunder of the rocket engines was tremendous. One of the rockets from Wassenaar ended its five-minute journey traveling three times the speed of sound when it slammed into English soil at Staveley Road in Chiswick. The other rocket came down in a field at Epping (north of London).

   The thunderous impact at Chiswick echoed all across London. First, a whip cracking sound was heard, which was created by the rocket moving faster than the speed of sound, as the air pressure bounced off the point of impact split seconds before the flash of impact. The explosion of the warhead churned debris and earth skyward. Almost immediately afterwards, as in reverse order, the whine and rush of whistling air was heard as the rocket descended, followed by the ominous roar of the incoming rocket, before it tapered off to silence. The explosion had killed three people, including Private Frank Browning, who was in a hurry that payday to visit his girlfriend s house. Seventeen other people had been seriously injured in the blast, covered by the debris of their wrecked homes until rescue workers pulled them free. Eleven homes situated on Staveley Road were totally flattened, while two dozen more sustained substantial damage. As more and more residents emerged from their homes many were surprised to find the blast radius was so broad; windows of houses almost two miles away had been blown out by the tremendous concussion. The whole area was impassable.

"The horrors of the war are increasing due to the V-2 launching sites. We see fires burning in The Hague, huge columns of smoke. We heard the screaming bombs falling on Bezuidenhout, which brought death and misery only a hundred meters from us. At the same time we see the rockets launching, the roaring and flaming V-2, holding our breath to see if the launch was successful, if not, will it fall back on the homes of innocent people. It is horrible to see the monsters take off in the middle of the night between the houses, lighting up the skies. One can imagine the terrors that come upon us now that The Hague is a front-line town, bombed continuously for more than ten days. Buildings, burning and smouldering furiously, a town choking from smoke, women and children fleeing. What misery, what distress."

Quote from the Resistance newspaper Trouw



   That morning, the German firing crews in Wassenaar had hoped to get an earlier start. However, the strong winds from the passing storm had knocked down a tree, which fell on one of the radio tents of the Brennschluss position several miles away. Finally, late in the afternoon around 4:30 PM, German trucks and odd-looking vehicles were seen driving up to the Wassenaar sites coming from the direction of Raaphorst. One of the vehicles was described by eyewitnesses as a long trailer having many wheels with some sort of lifting apparatus (Meillerwagen). Others included tanker trucks and trailers, which were filled from a railway wagon at Wassenaar Station, and an armored halftrack, which had been left about 1,000 feet away from the launching positions.
 
   Occupants of the nearby houses had been evicted the day before by German military guards who ordered them to leave their doors and windows opened; no one was allowed within half a mile of the area, but the noises and flurry of activity prompted a few daring souls to venture closer for a peek. The launching crews consisted of about 20 soldiers who, when fueling the missiles, were completely clad from head to toe with asbestos-like protective overalls and helmets. It was later discovered that the projectiles were fired using a power cable brought out from a nearby electrical supply point. The Germans had installed a number of these electrical cables, connected to normal power mains, which positioned in the neighborhood via the roads Rijksstraatweg and Rust En Vreugdlaan.

   Mr. Van Fliet visited the launching site as soon as possible after the event. Both firing positions were in the middle of roadways passing through the tree-lined neighborhood. At each launching place, there was a circular patch where the road had been melted or burned. The burned patch had a diameter of 9 meters and the road was about 10 meters across at the longest point. In the center of each burned patch was an unburned area in the form of a box suggesting that some sort of stand was used to cradle the missiles. The trees near the edge of the roadway were very badly burned up to a height of about 1 meter and less badly burned near the treetops. There was also evidence of a violent low blast, as the grass was flattened out and all the leaves had strangely vanished from the ground below the trees. The thatched roof of a nearby small house had been lifted and blown off.

   Immediately after launching the missiles, the soldiers of second battery of Battalion 485 (2./485) packed their equipment and drove away from the launching area. On the following day, a report from the V-2 command post at Duivenvoorde Castle in Voorschoten was forwarded to Division z.V. (Division for Retaliation) at General Kammler s headquarters: The rocket weapon was effective. Two rounds launched against London. In London, military officials knew immediately what had happened the V-2, code name Big Ben, had finally arrived on British soil. In 2004 city officials from both Wassenaar and Chiswick presided over ceremonies for the dedication of markers in both cities indicating the launching point and impact point for this first V-2 attack.

   Planning for the rocket attacks had begun months before. German scouts, transport specialists, and surveyors had visited The Hague in July and August of 1943 to identify potential launch sites and support areas for rocket operations. They traveled around The Hague, Rijswijk, Wassenaar, Loosduinen, Ockenburgh, and Leiden. Members of the Vermessungsbatterie (Survey Battery) from Peenem nde carried out triangulation measurements at predetermined locations. Each potential launching point was calculated in this manner. Members of the Erkundungsstab (Exploratory Staff) had arrived to determine where the soil was suitable for firing the heavy missile. Ground pressure tests were carried out at the Duindigt estate in Wassenaar and ten months later the V-2 troops would indeed set up launching sites at Duindigt. At many points, site markers were hammered into the ground in order to be able to find the designated places later on. In addition, the units examined the roadway Rijksstraatweg between Leiden and The Hague, which provided the main route between the transport depot and firing locations.

Photos on left: 5 photos (top) of the intersection of the streets Koekoekslaan/Schouwweg/Rust en Vreugdlaan in Wassenaar 2014. 3 photos (bottom) of the second launch site about 50 meters away at the intersection of Lijsterlaan/Koekoekslaan/Konijnenlaan. From these spots the first two rockets targeting London were fired on Sept. 8, 1944.
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   At the start of the campaign on August 31, 1944, the first and second batteries of Battalion 485 (1./485 and 2./485) boarded trains at Schneidem hl/G lzow in Hinterpommern for transportation to the deployment area. On September 3, the batteries reached Kranenburg/Kleve and were assembled to proceed with their journey to the coast, commencing that same evening. Progressing in a convoy of trucks, tractors, and trailers, they reached the vicinity of Steensel/Eindhoven on September 4. From there, the paths of the two batteries split ways, with the 1./485 moving through Tilburg, and the 2./485 traveling via Turnhout. Traveling without fuel reserves, the 1./485 arrived in Breda. They then headed towards Bergen op Zoom but encountered retreating German forces, causing to the convoy to turn back. Several battalion vehicles were left behind due to running out of fuel. Battery 2./485 traveled through Turnhout and Huijbergen on its route to an area south of Bergen op Zoom, in the woods of Wouwse Plantage.

   The coastal areas of Belgium were being overrun by advancing Allied forces. The disorderly circumstances led to the destruction of the bridges over the Scheldt and the Scheldt Canal. The intended operational zone for the rocket batteries was now inaccessible. As British and Canadian forces moved to secure Antwerp, it was rumored that a trainload of V-2s had to be hastily withdrawn from the area north of Antwerp. Due to the evolving situation in the region, the rocket convoys altered their plans and set course for The Hague on the Dutch coast. The two batteries of 485 each chose their own route. Battery 2./485 moved through Raamsdonk and Rotterdam to Castle Haarzuilens near Utrecht. On September 6, 1944, they left for The Hague with the 2./91 Technical Battery.

   On September 9, 1944, RAF aircraft, informed by the Dutch Resistance, targeted the site of the first V-2 launches, but the rocket troops had already left. The field store positions of 2./91 Technical Battery were attacked at Rust en Vreugd, which resulted in losses of men and material. The second battery of Battalion 485 (2./485) had set up operations on the grounds of the Beukenhorst estate, a few miles to the southwest; firing only one missile this day, which fell into the sea. On the same day, after completing their journey from Tilburg to Utrecht, Battery 1./485 successfully integrated with the second battery and began participating in firing operations. Following this, the mobile batteries underwent a strategic relocation to new firing sites in the areas of Wassenaar and The Hague.



THE FIRST V-2 LAUNCH SITES IN WASSENAAR
VIDEO HISTORY TODAY



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       A-STOFF LOX TRAILERS BEHIND A TATRA 111 TRUCK IN TILBURG AREA
   The soldiers moved onto the grounds of the large Duindigt estate. A branch from the local tramway network was used to supply power to the launch sites, which were dispersed over the large estate. Later that day, around 9:25 PM, the 1./485 at Beukenhorst fired a V-2 that impacted in England at Fambridge in Essex. The rocket disintegrated before impact causing only light damage to buildings on two farms. The next day, September 11, two batteries of Battalion 485 fired three rockets from Beukenhorst. One rocket fell in Crockenhill, Orpington, Kent. Another came down at Magdalen Laver, falling in a farm meadow.

   The recent RAF air attacks prompted local government officials to order the evacuation of Wassenaar, with the exception of the area behind the Kerkdam. Within three days, the entire area between the viaduct on the Leidschenstraatweg and Kerkdam, including Marlot Park Fliet, was evacuated. The departure of the thousands of residents from the threatened area was not fully completed when another air raid followed. On September 14, around 1:30 PM, the first bombs fell on Raaphorst, near the place where some rockets were reportedly observed. Three days later, there was a larger bombardment of the same area.

  
Even though the rocket attacks had begun, the concerns of the launching crews were far from over. Fuel and supplies, especially liquid-oxygen, were being brought in from Germany in frustratingly small amounts. The rockets were another problem. By the time they reached their launching sites, more than half were not fit for firing. With only two platoons and two firing tables, 1./485 was lacking vehicles and equipment and struggled to launch many rockets.


ANNOUNCEMENT FOR EVACUATION OF WASSENAAR
FOLLOWING FIRST V-2 LAUNCHES

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   Daily technical reports coming to headquarters reported a variety of problems such as oil in the liquid-oxygen. This occurred when the liquid-oxygen had been stored too long in the transport bowser. The oil residue caused explosions upon ignition of the combustion unit. A thorough cleaning of the bowsers cleared up this problem and stopped the explosions, but damage to materials and to the launch sites caused further delays.

   General Dornberger s chief supply officer had moved the rockets by train from the Mittelwerk factory at Nordhausen to the area of Koblenz, where they were stockpiled in depots along the German border. Once at the border, LXV Corps transported them to the main storage facility where the 511 Field Workshop Company unloaded and stored the rockets until they were required. There they remained for weeks at a time. When they were finally brought over to the launching crews, many of the V-2s were in poor condition. Vital components had corroded away, and the electrical systems were especially vulnerable. Because of these conditions, the rate of fire was well below Hitler s imagined onslaught. The familiar airburst problem, along with in-flight mechanical problems, caused many rockets to fall in the North Sea or in sparsely populated areas.

   SS General Kammler s staff, which was thrown together at the last minute, was unable to cope with all questions arising after the start of the rocket offensive. Because of his military command inexperience, he made many elementary mistakes. For example, after the start of the offensive, Kammler could not get in touch with his troops. He knew nothing of their whereabouts, particularly Battalion 485 in the Netherlands. Some of the most essential equipment and spare parts had been left behind. On September 5, the day designated for the offensive to begin, the troops discovered that no warheads had been shipped to the operational areas, which postponed the opening of the offensive for several days. The battalions went into action with specialized tankers, trailers, and trucks to carry the rocket fuels, but the motorized columns had no tankers along to carry regular gasoline for their vehicles. When told of the problem, Kammler suggested the troops should just fill up the emptied alcohol tankers with gasoline. Immediately, the coating inside of the tanks specially made for the storage of alcohol was completely ruined. The alcohol tankers, which were in short supply and needed at the front, had to be sent back to Germany for repairs.

   On September 12, the soldiers moved into apartment billets at Marlot, adjacent to the Duindigt estate. That day, between the hours of 6:00 AM and 9:40 PM, five more V-2s were launched. Londoners were treated to more of the mysterious bangs, one of which landed on the Chrysler manufacturing plant at Kew Gardens, killing eight people and causing extensive damage. On September 14, two rockets launched from Wassenaar failed one from the intersection of the streets Schouwweg and Oud Wassenaarscheweg, the other from Beukenlaan and Oud Wassenaarscheweg. Each one crashed into the North Sea, just off the coastline north of Kijkduin. Another launched from the grounds of the Beukenhorst estate impacted British soil at Walthamstow, digging a crater 25 feet deep and killing seven people.

   Quickly, the Dutch Resistance was able to get maps and messages to the British detailing the new locations and operations of the German rocket troops. No. 229 Squadron was the first RAF fighter unit activated to counter the V-2 threat. On September 10, two Spitfires of No. 229 Squadron took off around 7:00 AM from RAF Coltishall airfield, 8 miles northeast of Norwich. The pilots conducted a reconnaissance mission along the coastal parish of the Netherlands searching for any signs of rocket activity. At 2:00 PM eight more Spitfires took off flying over over the Zuiderzee, then attacking two trains caught in the open. On September 13, 1944, the RAF attacked the anti-aircraft positions postioned around the royal estates De Horsten.

   Both the RAF and the U.S. Army Air Force did their best to locate the missiles, and on many occasions sent hundreds of fighters over the Netherlands to strafe anything that looked like a target. Anyone caught in the open risked being attacked. Allied pilots even shot at civilian cyclists on the roads. Even though foxholes had been dug at various points along the main road of Rijksstraatweg to act as quick shelters in the event of an air attack, corpses and bicycles frequently lay beside the main roads near the launching areas. Whenever the planes came, the German soldiers would dive into the foxholes. At one point on the main road from The Hague to Wassenaar, a large sign read, Achtung, Strafing Attacks: foxholes left!

   But because of the rocket s surreptitiousness and camouflaged firing positions, it proved difficult for pilots to locate the rocket batteries on the ground. It took Allied Intelligence quite a while before they found out just how mobile the new rockets were. Not only was the rocket impossible to stop after firing, but was also going to be a major headache to stop on the ground. Even so, the fighter-bomber sweeps shot up a lot of vehicles and railway cars and were partially responsible for shortages of liquid-oxygen and other supplies at the V-2 launch sites throughout the fall of 1944.

  Just after noon on Sunday, September 17, 1944, twelve Spitfires of No. 229 Squadron RAF took off from their base at Coltishall. Their mission was to scan a stretch of the Dutch coast looking for evidence of rocket activity. While patrolling at 12,000 feet over the north part of the Netherlands, they witnessed a V-2 rising in the distance at terrific speed. The rocket impacted several minutes later in greater London at Coulsdon. The Spitfires were too far away to discern the exact location where the rocket had been fired. They could only report the general location, which was near the coast, possibly The Hague. Battalion 485 launched their final rocket of the day at 6:50 PM, which came down at Adelaide Road, Brockley, at Lewisham, killing 14 people and injuring another 41. Over a five-day period from September 13-17, 1944, fifteen rocket impacts had been recorded in southern England, with about half falling in London.


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ABOVE: AREAS OF EARLY V-2 OPERATIONS IN WASSENAAR AND ENVIRONS

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EARLY V-2 OPERATIONS IN WASSENAAR AND THE HAGUE____
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   Also on September 17, later in the evening, acting on a tip from the Dutch underground, 27 Lancaster bombers and 5 Mosquitos dropped their bombs over Raaphorst, which included the surrounding area near Beukenhorst between Raaphorstlaan and Eikenhorstlaan. These heavily wooded areas southeast of Wassenaar were suspected as firing locations, but in fact only one location on Brievenkastlaan had been used. German personnel were surprised by the unexpected bombardment and quickly sought shelter. Dozens of bombs landed in the forest, where they blasted wide craters into the loose ground. 169 tons of Brisant high explosive bombs and twenty-four 250-pound marker-bombs were dropped. Three farms were damaged and a house on the Raaphorst estate was blown into ruins. However, there were no civilian casualties because the farmers had received prior warning of coming raid from the Dutch Resistance. They were lucky only a few months before, the Raaphorst estate was transformed into a munitions depot. A large number of wooden bunkers were laid into the grounds of the estate, covered with a heavy layer of earth. The British bombers disappeared with a sharp turn in a westerly direction over the sea. However, because the V-2 crews had dispersed all of their materials under the dense foliage of Ter Horst, the bombs had little effect on rocket operations. Most of the bombs hit west of Raaphorst, mainly on Oak Horst. Approximately thirty trucks and six Meillerwagens carrying tarpaulin-covered V-2s passed by Raaphorst the following morning. The area would be used no more for these and other reasons.

   In September 1944, as the Allied front surged toward the German frontier, the V-2 rocket campaign entered a period of frantic movement and mounting tension. Following their transfer to V-2 Group North, Battery 444 and elements of Technical Battalion 91 began a strategic shift from Belgium toward the Dutch island of Walcheren. This move was carefully choreographed; between September 10 and 11, the unit staged through Reichswald, south of Cleve. It was here that Major Paschmeyer scouted the path forward, identifying the ideal launch positions that would eventually bring London within a favorable 265-kilometer range.

   By September 12, the fast elements of Battery 444 had reached Bergen op Zoom, while advance parties slipped toward Walcheren under the cover of night. At the same time, SS General Kammler established his command post near Nijmegen to oversee the escalating offensive. Despite the arrival of fresh engineers to relieve exhausted personnel, the atmosphere was one of extreme precariousness. While Battalion 485 continued its sustained barrage against London from launch sites around The Hague, the rapid and relentless Allied advance into Belgium compelled German commanders to keep their units on constant high alert, fully prepared to abandon positions and withdraw eastward at a moment s notice, in order to prevent the secret weapon, its crews, and vital equipment from being discovered, captured, or neutralized by advancing enemy forces.
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   This movement soon became a race against Allied air superiority. Starting September 14, Group North endured relentless bombing of traffic junctions and launch areas. Though one prepared site south of Den Haag was obliterated and supply lines were frequently severed for hours at a time, the units pressed on under extreme pressure and constant threat from fighter-bombers. On September 16, the first rockets were successfully launched from Serooskerke on Walcheren with General Kammler in attendance. Over the next two days, six rockets were fired at London, even as British radio prematurely claimed the launch sites had been destroyed.


   In early September 1944, Allied intelligence confirmed that German V-2 rockets had been operating for several weeks from launch sites along the Dutch coast, a threat that strongly influenced British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery as he pressed Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower for a new Allied offensive into the Netherlands. Abandoning his original plan to cross the Rhine near Wesel, Montgomery revised his concept in response to the missile danger and proposed a bold single-thrust plan, calling for a combined United States and British airborne assault rapidly followed by ground forces to drive deep into German-held territory.

   The objective was to establish a Rhine River bridgehead, open a direct invasion route into northern Germany, and, by cutting off the Netherlands, potentially neutralize the V-2 launch areas altogether. This concept was put into action on September 17 with the launch of Operation Market Garden, an ambitious airborne and ground offensive designed to seize nine key bridges and create a 64-mile salient into the Netherlands, while also disrupting German command, supply lines, and communications across the region. The operation involved three airborne divisions British 1st Airborne at Arnhem, U.S. 82nd Airborne at Nijmegen, and U.S. 101st Airborne at Eindhoven who were dropped behind enemy lines to secure the bridges for the advancing ground forces of the British XXX Corps. The massive Allied landings around Nijmegen and Arnhem directly threatened German rocket positions and triggered an immediate crisis, as the rapidly deteriorating military situation forced SS General Kammler to evacuate his newly established command post and relocate his staff under pressing operational constraints. Fierce German resistance, logistical challenges, and delayed reinforcements would ultimately slow the Allied advance, leaving some objectives, most notably the Arnhem bridge, only partially secured.


   Amid the rapidly collapsing front in mid-September 1944, German rocket units began a coordinated withdrawal that temporarily ended V-2 operations in the western Netherlands, including those on Walcheren. Battery 444 retreated through Arnhem toward Zutphen, while Batteries 2./485 and 1./485 departed The Hague during the night of September 17 18, 1944. As the command group evacuated from Castle Duivenvoorde, they were followed by rocket troops from Duindigt, Beukenhorst, and Ter Horst acting under orders from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) moved their vehicles north to Overveen near Haarlem before retreating deeper into Germany, eventually reaching Burgsteinfurt in Westphalia. From there, 1./485 re-established operations west of the small town of Legden, setting up two firing sites at Heek and Beikelort, from which it launched a total of 21 rockets between September 21 and October 8 against continental targets including Louvain, Tournai, Maastricht, and Li ge.

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ABOVE: VIEWS UP RIJKSSTRAATWEG IN WASSENAAR

   The failure of Operation Market Garden at Arnhem can be partly blamed on the attempt to extend the offensive to neutralize the missile threat. In addition, the bombardment of the Antwerp harbor slowed the offloading of supplies significantly, resulting in decisions that ultimately prevented the port from ever becoming completely operational. There was not much the Allies could do to stop the rocket attacks. The V-2s were effective simply because they traveled at such great heights and at great speeds that shooting them down was impossible. The only successful counter to the V-2 was the eventual overrunning of the missile launching sites, which finally pushed the firing crews out of range.

    At the beginning of Allied offensive, American forces almost seized rocket force commander SS General Kammler at his headquarters near
Nijmegen. When the airborne landings commenced Kammler had quickly moved his headquarters from a large hotel in close to Berg en Dal to Schaarsbergen; then again, he retreated to the German town of Darfeld in Burgsteinfurt for a short time. After moving again to Ludenscheid on September 21, he established a permanent headquarters in Germany, east of Dortmund at Suttrop bei Warstein on October 3, 1944. It is often reported that Kammler s headquarters was located for a time in the Dutch town of Haaksbergen. In fact, there was no German headquarters of any kind at Haaksbergen. It may have been confusion between the names Haaksbergen and Schaarsbergen. Schaarsbergen was about 20 kilometers from Apeldoorn, and many German barracks were concentrated in this area. General Dornberger and General Kammler reportedly met on several occasions at a location near Apeldoorn.

   Following the collapse of Operation Market Garden to achieve its objectves, the rocket troops were ordered back to The Hague on September 30. The second battery of 485 started its return journey on October 1, arriving on October 2. They took up positions at Hoek van Holland, Ockenburgh, and Bloemendaal. Following the evacuation of local civilians, the troops of 2./485 restarted the rocket offensive against London on the night of October 3, 1944. The first battery of 485 did not immediately join them and remained in Burgsteinfurt.

   For three more weeks, Battery 444 continued to fire from Rijs. The commander of Battery 444, Hauptmann M ller, was a rocket troop veteran and engineer with extensive knowledge of the battery. As a member of Versuchskommando Nord, he had long-standing exposure to the V-2 at Peenem nde and later in Poland. A modest and thoughtful leader, he was respected by his subordinates. Tactically, the Battery was directly subordinate to the Division Commander SS-Gruppenf hrer Kammler. In a brief appearance at Rijs, SS General Kammler reviewed the activities of the battery. Speaking with battery leader M ller, Kammler ordered the unit to move to The Hague immediately. For security reasons, he ordered Captain M ller to round up 500 local civilians and execute them before leaving the area, saying something to the effect, Your men must finally learn to see blood flowing. When Kammler drove away, M ller ignored the order. The last rocket fired by Battery 444 headed towards the port of Antwerp on the morning of October 20. Suddenly, Battery 444 packed up and left for The Hague on the night of October 21. Traveling by night, they soon joined 2./485 for rocket operations against London.


OCKENBURGH / BLOEMENDAAL


   During the short absence of the V-2 troops in Wassenaar, the evacuated residents of Wassenaar had received permission to reoccupy their homes. When the rocket troops returned, new launching sites were selected for V-2 operations. In the southern part of The Hague, two new launch sites were prepared. For the first time, the rocket units were going to take advantage of their mobility, making it more difficult for Allied aircraft to counter the missiles. A large area in the suburb of Loosduinen was closen.

   The area spanned both sides of main road Monsterseweg, which led from The Hague to Hoek van Holland, and included the spacious Ockenburgh country
estate as well as the grounds of the Bloemendaal mental hospital complex, along with the nearby estate Madestein. During the war, Ockenburgh and its deciduous forests were owned by the municipality of The Hague and were located in the restricted zone of the Atlantic Wall. The Germans had already decided to evacuate most of Loosduinen at Bloemendaal earlier in September to ensure the security of new launching points for V-2s and because of potential bombing attacks by the Allies. For some odd reason a peculiar exception was made for the residents of several farms near Bloemendaal. They had the option to continue living in their homes, however, doing so presented a significant risk to their safety and well-being due to the possibility of rocket failures or attacks from the RAF. Staying put could expose them to danger.

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   In the early hours of October 3, 1944, the crews of 2./485 drove their vehicles through the narrow entrance gate at Ockenburgh, with the first Meillerwagen arriving around 9:00 AM that morning. The launching sites were located in the surroundings of the Ockenburgh summerhouses, north from Monsterscheweg. That evening, after launch site preparations were finished, the first rockets were raised and then fueled. A rocket was launched at 11:05 PM and impacted minutes later in the Wanstead district of east London, killing 8 people and destroying 5 houses. Forty minutes later, a second V-2 was fired. After rising slowly, an explosion occurred at low altitude that sent the wreakage tumbling into the Kijkduin dunes.

   The area spanned both sides of main road Monsterseweg, which led from The Hague to Hoek van Holland, and included the spacious Ockenburgh country estate as well as the grounds of the Bloemendaal mental hospital complex, along with the nearby estate Madestein. During the war, Ockenburgh and its deciduous forests were owned by the municipality of The Hague and were located in the restricted zone of the Atlantic Wall.

   The Germans had already decided to evacuate most of Loosduinen at Bloemendaal earlier in September to ensure the security of new launching points for V-2s and because of potential bombing attacks by the Allies.

   For some inexplicable reason, an unusual exception was granted to the residents of a handful of farms in the vicinity of Bloemendaal. Unlike other civilians in the area, they were not ordered to evacuate their homes, allowing them to remain amidst an environment fraught with danger. Staying, however, came at a grave risk: the constant threat of malfunctioning rockets, coupled with the possibility of retaliatory attacks by the Royal Air Force (RAF), meant that every day in their homes could be their last. It seemed the rocket troops had a strategic interest in allowing the farmers to remain, perhaps relying on them to continue supplying provisions and sustenance to the military personnel in the area. In essence, these families were caught in a perilous balancing act, maintaining their livelihoods and supporting the occupying forces, all while living under the constant shadow of potential destruction.

  
On October 7, on the property close to the main hospital building (Ockenburgh Kliniek) the first rocket was fired from a new launch site at Bloemendaal. About 1,000 meters from Ockenburgh, on the opposite side of Monsterseweg, was the psychiatric care complex of Bloemendaal. This large hospital park consisted of a number of various buildings, in its own little community. Care pavilions, a small church, physician s homes, along with a farm, all made up the bucolic neighborhood. Patients had left in 1943 during the major evacuation from the coastal area and only a few doctors and a few members of staff had remained.

   Bloemendaal was perfect place to launch V-2s because large trees provided excellent protection from the wind and the narrow lanes offered concealment from the RAF. In addition, the main road of Monsterseweg was an easy supply route for the rockets and fuel tankers coming from the railhead. Before launching, the V-2s waited temporarily under the trees along the narrow lanes around the Bloemendaal church, which was located in the middle of the complex. The rocket troops had already requisitioned the complex and used its buildings as barracks. Soon, multiple launching sites were established in the surroundings, which included Madestein, Ockenrode, and Monsterseweg. At Bloemendaal, the launch sites were very simple, on roads or sometimes reinforced paths, and were usually spaced at 50-100 yard intervals.

   Very few residents dared to venture near, but despite that, the Dutch Resistance managed to map out the launch sites at Ockenburgh as well as Bloemendaal clinic. At various places in Loosduinen, anti-aircraft guns were positioned for the protection of the V-2 sites from roaming RAF fighters. On the road Pieter de Hooghplein, now Cantateplein, stood a half-tracked anti-aircraft vehicle equipped with twin 37 mm flak guns. On the morning of October 18, 1944, six fighter-bombers attacked the area of Ockenburgh. Nine bombs ended up hitting 3 locations, namely on the Petunia Square, on the Ockenburgh estate, and on the grounds of the Bloemendaal clinic. The bombs caught a rocket on a Meillerwagen unconcealed, out in the open. Shrapnel damaged the rocket. In the first weeks of October, V-2s were fired from both Wassenaar and Loosduinen sometimes simultaneously.

Modern Bloemendaal aerial photographs: Photo 1, Photo 2, Photo 3

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V-2 LAUNCHING AREAS IN THE VICINITY OF THE OCKENBURGH ESTATE
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PHOTOS ABOVE SHOW THE AREAS OF V-2 OPERATIONS AT OCKENBURGH AND BLOEMENDAAL, SITUATED ALONG MONSTERSEWEG

   Since the beginning of rocket operations Gruppe Nord (Group North) had been commanded by Major Bernd von Ploetz, who had over 1,000 men under his command in The Hague. The initial command post for the rocket troops during the period of September 8-17, 1944, was located at Duivenvoorde Castle at Voorschoten. When the rocket troops returned following Operation Market Garden, the command post was relocated to the apartment building of Marlot. This was closer to the Duindigt estate, which was soon to become one of the main launching sites. Von Ploetz was replaced by Major Schulz on October 21. On that same day, Gruppe Nord s numbers were strengthened when Training and Experimental Battery 444 arrived from Stavoren and joined 2./485 for operations from the Dutch coast. Portions from Battery 444 moved onto the grounds at Duindigt and Rijswijk to begin firing at London on October 23.

   Upon their arrival in The Hague, the soldiers of Battery 444 were billeted in commandeered villas and apartments in the affluent area of the seaside resort town of Scheveningen. The soldiers from 2./485 were already billeted in this area. The main firing sites to the east were an easy 30-minute walk away. Many rocket firings in The Hague took place in restricted areas known as the Sperrgebiet. This narrow two-mile piece of land ran through the old city parallel to the coast. A few years earlier, this part of the city had been evacuated during the construction of the Atlantic Wall defenses. With the increased frequency of RAF attacks, the restricted zone was widened, reducing civilian casualties and increasing the number of potential rocket launch sites. Almost all Scheveningers were forced to leave their homes, with no more than six thousand people allowed to stay. Somehow, these people were important for the maintenance of the Sperrgebiet fortress area.

   After a number of weeks, the people of The Hague had seen many rockets soaring into the sky from their homes. Initially, Dutch onlookers marveled at the sight of missiles roaring off their firing tables. German crews faced hard work and tense nerves when preparing a V-2 for firing. There was a great deal of complexity to the weapon, involving intricate guidance systems, volatile fuels, and delicate engineering tolerances. There was a possibility that even the smallest error could cause it to malfunction and crash or explode catastrophically, killing crews, destroying equipment, and leaving little trace behind.

   Security measures near the launching sites were very strict. The Germans wanted to prevent prying eyes from witnessing launch preparations, but civilians still managed to get close enough for a good look. Some young children were free to go in and out of the restricted areas, such as the Haagse Bos, to gather firewood for their families and could go into the Sperrgebiet without being bothered. Once inside the restricted zone, some of the children became acquainted with the German soldiers. They would strike up conversations with the uniformed men and were able to learn detailed information about the rockets, their schedules, destinations, and the routines of the launch crews. At times, the children secretly inched dangerously close to observe an actual rocket launch, feeling the ground tremble, hearing the roar, and risking death from explosions or debris.


MODERN ENTRANCE TO OCKENBURGH




BLOEMENDAAL CHURCH




OCKENBURGH CLINIC 2023


   Rita Winter was a young Dutch girl living with her mother and younger brother on Damastraat, in the suburb of Rijswijk. One day Rita s little brother, Frans, came home telling a wild story to his mother about how they must leave their home immediately. When questioned further, the boy said he met some German soldiers (Battery 444) while playing that afternoon. One of the soldiers had told him that a special new weapon would be fired that evening around 8:00 PM, and they were unsure if the ground was firm enough to support the weapon. The soldiers told Frans to consider leaving his home because there was a significant risk that the weapon could tip over and potentially explode. Such an explosion could cause damage, not only to his own property, but also to the nearby houses in the vicinity, leading to widespread destruction and endangering the lives of those who lived around him. Rita remembers that her mother laughed very hard, thinking the young boy was fabricating the story, Ja, sure they told you that!

   On October 23, Battery 444 established a new firing point, outside of the Sperrgebiet, near Rita Winter s home. It was just past the gardens and the villas, on the grounds of the Rijswijkse Bos (Rijswijk Forest). A secluded clearing already existed in the wood where a monument, built in 1792, stood on the previous location of the castle of the Prince of Orange. It was here, in 1697, that the peace treaty to end the War of the Grand Alliance was signed between England, France, Spain, Germany, and The Netherlands. The newly established V-2 launch site was, quite ironically, positioned just a few yards away from the prominent peace obelisk that stood as a symbol of tranquility and harmony.

   Rita remembers that her mother paid no more attention to her younger brother s exaggerations and went about her daily chores that evening. At exactly 8:00 PM, they were startled by the thump and roar of the V-2 s engine coming to life. Rita thought her lungs would blow apart. Her mother ran to the window in time to see the rocket rise over their home, the red glare from the engine exhaust lighting up the streets as if it were daytime. The noise from the engine stopped and few seconds later, the rocket went down with a flash on the west dune at Scheveningen. Later that night, several more rockets were fired.

   During the first three weeks of October, usually one or two rockets were launched per day; but now with Battery 444 also firing from The Hague, five firing tables were in operation daily and no less than six to seven missiles were launched each day. Immediately after sundown, V-2s were being towed down Vredeburgerweg in Rijswijk to the new launching site, their movements carefully timed to darkness and bad weather to avoid detection.

   Battery 444 also used several launching sites on the grounds of the Duindigt estate, as well as two new sites situated near the horse racing track behind the estate property, where trees and buildings offered concealment. The launching site at Beukenhorst was still in use, as were sites near the Promenade Hotel at Scheveningseweg, and also in the Haagse Bos. These firing sites had to be wide enough for tanker vehicles to maneuver and easily fill the V-2 propellant tanks, a process that was both hazardous and time-consuming.

   The Resistance undoubtedly played a significant role in providing the RAF with a wealth of information regarding various launching sites, convoy movements, and firing schedules. This intelligence was a key factor behind the decision to rotate launch sites frequently. The purpose was to keep Allied pilots in a state of uncertainty and guessing about where the next launch might occur. By continually changing the locations, the Germans effectively disrupted the RAF's response strategies, reduced the chances of successful air attacks, and prolonged the operational life of the missile campaign.


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RIJSWIJK MONUMENT TO PEACE PRIOR TO THE WAR

   

   On October 26, a new launch record was achieved by the two platoons of Battery 444. A total of nine rockets were fired from the sites at Wassenaar and Rijswijk, three within 25 minutes of each other. The following day, October 27, the results were not so good. Around 2:00 PM, from the firing site at Beukenhorst, Battery 444 launched a rocket that climbed steadily to a height of about 280 feet before the engine abruptly shut down. The rocket fell back almost directly on the launching point, coming down on the border of Beukenhorst and Wittenburg. Twelve soldiers were killed and much of their equipment was destroyed or badly damaged. The blast shattered roof tiles and windows within a 600-meter radius. As a result, Beukenhorst was abandoned, and the firing troops moved to the Langenhorst estate starting on November 4.

   Two hours later, as young Rita Winter walked with her two little nieces down a street near her home; she heard the start of another V-2. This one rose straight up from Rijswijk, and then the engine began to stammer. The rocket oscillated back and forth before crashing to earth. The girls ducked into the window bay of a store front. The rocket came down about three quarters of a mile away at Van Vredeburgerweg and ripped a fifteen-meter wide crater in the meadow opposite the boys school House of the Crusaders of St. John in the park Nieuwvoorde near Wateringen. The main building was destroyed, while the other buildings of the Roman Catholic boys institute were severely damaged. Seven boys and five brothers in the ages between nine and twenty-eight were killed instantly and five were seriously injured, two died later. The following day, the Rijswijk and Beukenhorst launch sites were abandoned. It had not been a good day for Battery 444 it had been just as bad for the Dutch residents.
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   With the V-2 attacks underway, the German concept for mobile rocket operations was put to the test. The idea was to keep the logistics as simple as possible, which was difficult considering that there would be hundreds of troops and specialized vehicles involved, not to mention complicated supply issues. A typical trailer-mounted rocket was supported by about 30 vehicles, which included a transport trailer, mobile crane, launch table and trailer, propellant vehicles, and command and control trucks.

   The rockets and warheads, along with the liquid-oxygen and alcohol, would be delivered to the firing areas by railway. The deployment of the missiles to the mobile firing sites was certainly not an easy task, but it was a task that the Germans performed quite efficiently. One of the biggest challenges was the coordination of the multitude of troops that were required.













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V-2 MATERIAL FOUND IN THE WATERS OF CASTLE WITTENBURG IN WASSENAAR

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   The basic organization of a V-2 battery in The Hague was very much like a traditional German motorized artillery unit. It consisted of five primary sections, along with various other units. All battery personnel carried the usual combat weapons of normal Wehrmacht units, along with the specific equipment associated with their duties. The headquarters section maintained the battery troop headquarters. The staff was under the direction of the unit commander. It was responsible for general military administration, recording all the operations of the unit, communication, and for range calculations and map plotting.

   The launching section troops were split into three individual firing platoons, each with its own Feuerleitpanzer firing control vehicle and launching table. In most situations, there were three Meillerwagens for each platoon nine Meillerwagens per battery. Each firing platoon contained around 39 men, all with a specific duty to perform during the execution of certain routine tests in the preparation of the rocket. Platoons included the fire control crew with the Feuerleitpanzer, along with the surveying and adjustment crew, which were responsible for the final survey of the launch site and for the actual alignment of the rocket before firing. The engine crew, electrical crew, and the vehicle crew operated the Meillerwagen and firing table.
   The radio control section operated the Brennschluss antenna arrays, placed at a calculated distance several miles behind the firing point. The fuel and supply section consisted of four companies responsible for unloading the rockets and rocket fuels from the railhead. At Leiden, the first company of the supply detachment would transport the missiles to the field store. They used about three Vidalwagen road transport trailers for each Meillerwagen, making approximately 27 Vidalwagens per battery. The warheads were loaded onto trucks and brought separately to the field store. The second and third companies of the supply detachment delivered rocket fuels, while the fourth company provided gasoline and oil for battery vehicles. The technical section consisted of technicians that manned the field stores, tested vital components, and if necessary, repaired any possible defects on the rockets. The technical troops would then prepare the rockets, with warheads attached, for the firing platoons.

   Additional units included a maintenance platoon, which maintained the motorized transport vehicles and other mechanical equipment. The telephone section operated the communications between the sections and with the battalion headquarters. The camouflage section was responsible for creating camouflage arrangements around the firing positions, and a fire-fighting platoon was on hand if needed. Originally, a security platoon protected the areas surrounding and within the firing range, and the V-2 positions were supported by designated flak units, but following January 1945, the security troops, along with the flak units, were separated from their original organization. They subsequently became a part of the much larger defense zone that was established around The Hague, integrating their efforts into the broader military framework and enhancing the overall defensive strategy of the city.


       MEMORY SKETCH MADE BY STUDENT BILL WILS OF ROCKET TRANSPORT IN THE HAGUE


   The technical section consisted of technicians that manned the field stores, tested vital components, and if necessary, repaired any possible defects on the rockets. The technical troops would then prepare the rockets, with warheads attached, for the firing platoons. Additional units included a maintenance platoon, which maintained the motorized transport vehicles and other mechanical equipment. The telephone section operated the communications between the sections and with the battalion headquarters.

   The camouflage section was responsible for creating camouflage arrangements around the firing positions, and a fire-fighting platoon was on hand if needed. Originally, a security platoon protected the areas surrounding and within the firing range, and the V-2 positions were supported by designated flak units, but after January of 1945 the security troops and flak units were no longer attached to the organization and became part of the greater defense zone of The Hague.

PHOTOS BELOW: STRAATSSPOOR STATION AND SCENES OF OCCUPATION DURING THE V-2 CAMPAIGN IN THE HAGUE











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LEIDEN

   The rockets coming by railway from Germany were offloaded at Leiden, north of The Hague. The rail tankers carrying rocket fuels continued south into The Hague. The offloading of liquid-oxygen and the other propellants took place immediately after the arrival of the train at the Staatsspoor station near the Emmakliniek (Schenkweg) and at a sideline of the Hollandsspoor station behind Zwetstraat. Eventually, because of changing logistics or RAF bombing damage, other offloading points were used. A complete list of fuels needed for a launch would be as follows: A-Stoff = liquid-oxygen; B-Stoff = alcohol consisting of: 45% ethanol, 30% methanol + 25% water (H2O), along with 175 kg hydrogen peroxide and 13 kg potassium permanganate, to generate steam for the fuel pump.



   Waiting at the station were the trucks and bowsers of the fueling teams. From the Abstellpark (fuel storage area), an average of eight Betriebstoffanhanger (liquid-oxygen bowser trailers), four Flugbetriebstoff-Kesselwagen (alcohol tanker trucks), and several other various types of trailers were readied for fueling operations. The fuels were transferred under the station canopy very quickly in order to prevent evaporation loss. The liquid-oxygen was then hurried to the firing positions. Tractors and trailers with the ice on the tanks were seen speeding through the streets of The Hague for months. The city of The Hague was the terminus of a direct railway line coming from Germany. These railways were extremely important to the Germans. Not only was it the fastest way to move troops, arms, and supplies, it was also the means by which forced laborers and Jews were moved to the east. The dense Dutch railway network was still largely intact in 1944 and was crucial to the German V-weapons deployment. The Dutch railways were fully integrated into the German lines from the east in order to make the transport of weapons as easy as possible.

   The V-2s arrived under the cover of darkness at the Leiden Centraal Station over the line from Utrecht or by the line from Amsterdam-Haarlem. Leaving Friedrichshaven, a V-2 train took approximately 35 hours to reach Leiden. The main entry points from Germany were Enschede, Oldenzaal, and Winschoten in the north, going through the important transit stations at Deventer, Zutfen, Apeldoorn, Amersfoort, and Utrecht, the main line from the west. In the woods near the Dutch town of Ommen the Germans laid out two new camouflaged railway sidings. Each siding was approximately one kilometer long and diverged to the south side of the main railway line. Bound for the launching sites in the western part of the Netherlands, the trains loaded with V-2s stayed there during the day, sheltered by the long roof of the main station, for protection from the RAF.

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     PERIOD MAP OF LEIDEN SHOWING ROAD AND RAIL NETWORK
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FOOTAGE FROM ALLIED FOOD DROPS OVER LEIDEN IN 1945
SHOWS PIONIERSPARK AT STATION HEERENSINGEL






V-2 TRANSPORT ROUTES THROUGH LEIDEN





























   Depending on the arrival time that night or the following night the train would be moved a few kilometers over a connecting line to the cargo offloading station at Heerensingel, which was on the other side of Leiden near the canals of the old city. Next to Station Heerensingel was the engineer s installation called Pionierspark. Many rockets and rocket parts were always at Pionierspark, as the wreckage from crashed V-2s was also returned to this location. On the siding at Pionierspark, the giant mobile crane straddled the track while the rockets were lifted from the flatcars and laid onto the Vidalwagen road transport trailers. Each train carried 20 rockets, and it took a little over one hour for the engineers to finish the offloading. Before the light of morning, the road transport vehicles would take the rockets away. Personnel of the Umschlagtrupps, consisting of a crane troop and offloading crew, carried out the transfer of the rockets from the railway wagon to the Vidalwagen. The Kraftfahr-Abteilung 900 transported the rockets to the intermediate storage facility. The rocket warheads were carried on the same train, but they were not attached to the rockets. They were offloaded separately.
A special detachment of German guards watched over the V-2 rail cars at all times. The Group North flak train was positioned near Leiden Centraal Station with its six heavily armed anti-aircraft rail cars.

Leiden Continued >



HAAGSE BOS

   The rockets were towed from Leiden on Vidalwagen road transport trailers to the technical troop s field store near the launching areas. In the early period, the projectiles were transported directly to the intermediate storage facility at Raaphorst and ter Horst. Later, the rockets were also stored on the site of the Marine Zeugamt (marine arsenal) at Maaldrift (near Wassenaar) and under the canopy of the Haagse Bos. From both locations, the projectiles were driven to the Technical Battery.

   Early in the campaign, the technical troop installed itself in the lush park of the De Wittenburg estate in Wassenaar, while a car park and repair shop had been installed nearby on the dairy farm at Rust en Vreugd. Later, the technical troops moved to the studio halls of the Filmstad on the Oosterbeek estate. Small stockpiles of rockets were always kept at the field store of the technical troops, to be able to deliver a few specimens immediately when the order was given. Here the warheads were attached to the nose of the rockets, and there was an opportunity for a final check of the instruments.

   The rockets were towed from Leiden on Vidalwagen road transport trailers to the technical troop s field store near the launching areas. In the early period, the projectiles were transported directly to the intermediate storage facility at Raaphorst and ter Horst. Later, the rockets were also stored on the site of the Marine Zeugamt (marine arsenal) at Maaldrift (near Wassenaar) and also under the canopy of the Haagse Bos. From both locations, the projectiles were driven to the Technical Battery. Early in the campaign, the technical troop installed itself in the lush park of the De Wittenburg estate in Wassenaar, while a car park and repair shop had been installed nearby on the dairy farm at Rust en Vreugd. Later, the technical troops moved to the studio halls of the Filmstad on the Oosterbeek estate. Small stockpiles of rockets were always kept at the field store of the technical troops, to be able to deliver a few specimens immediately when the order was given. Here the warheads were attached to the nose of the rockets, and there was an opportunity for a final check of the instruments.


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   ANTI-TANK DITCH CONSTRUCTION CUT THROUGH THE HAAGSE BOS


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                                             THE HAAGSE BOS (THE HAGUE FOREST) WAS INTEGRATED INTO THE DEFENSIVE FORTIFICATIONS AND V-2 OPERATIONS

   The V-2 s main strength was its mobility, as it was not tethered to any fixed launching points. To stabilize and launch the missile all that was needed was a firm surface, such as an asphalt or concrete road, or firm sandy ground. However, under the blast of the rocket s exhaust, old cobblestone roads would disintegrate, flinging stones in all directions. During inclimate or soggy weather, the crews sometimes used steel sleepers underneath the firing table for added stability. Despite the fact that well-established launch sites were already known to the RAF, crews preferred places with tall trees and returned to them over and over again. A tree-lined street, such as Rijksstraatweg-Benoordenhoutseweg, which runs north from Den Haag through Wassenaar, was the ideal launching site. It was firm and level, accessible to all launch vehicles, and the tall trees provided natural camouflage for the 46-foot high rockets.

   The Haagse Bos (Hague Forest) was a large forested city park in dating back before the middle ages. It is one of the oldest oak forests in the Netherlands. The primeval forest originally stretched from Hoek van Holland in south all the way to Alkmaar in the north. Previously covering the entire area, the forest was known then as Houtland, but by twentieth century, only the Haagse Bos remained. Over the centuries, the forest was gradually reduced as the population grew, until it was protected by officials as a local hunting and recreational area. Located inside the defensive fortifications of the Scheveningen and Clingendael, the forest extended a little less than 2 miles and was about 500 yards wide, with its longest sides bordered by the main roads Benoordenhoutseweg and Bezuidenhoutseweg. On the south side a large portion of the forest had been cleared a few years earlier when an anti-tank ditch was scoured out through the city. A small portion of the anti-tank wall and ditch remains today at the intersection of t Hoenstraat and S102.

  
Through the length of the forest was the cobblestone street Leidsestraatweg, which gave easy access for the rocket troop vehicles to all parts of the forest. Located on the eastern end of the woods was the Paleis Huis Ten Bosch, which would later become the official residence of the Netherlands royal family in 1981. Even though the opulent building survived the war, it suffered damaged from the V-2 offensive.

   At the end of October, Battery 2./485 was withdrawn from The Hague and sent back to Burgsteinfurt in Germany. Their new task was to support the firings on Antwerp. Operating from launch sites near Heek, the crews of 2./485 were supposed to begin tests to improve the V-2 s accuracy by using the new Leitstrahl (guidance beam system). This meant for a number of weeks, only Battery 444 s platoons remained in The Hague to fire against London. Battery 1./485 would eventually travel from Germany to join Battery 444, but wouldn t arrive until mid-December.

   On November 1, 1944, the first rockets were fired from the heart of the city. Until that moment, the firing crews had operated in the surrounding suburbs, just on the outskirts of The Hague. The new firing locations were located in a strip near the Oude Scheveningseweg and Stadhouderslaan, a part of The Hague cleared previously for the defenses of the St tzpunktgruppe Scheveningen. A portion of the Scheveningse Bosjes trees were cut down, large villas had been demolished, leaving only the Gemeentemuseum. The launch sites were situated on the road of Kerkhoflaan, and at the junction Willem de Zwijgerlaan and Antonie Duyckstraat. The old hotel Promenade on the Oude Scheveningseweg served as V-2 storage for a short period. On November 5, a fierce southwestern storm broke out over The Hague and got worse over the next several days. The launches were halted. As soon as the weather cleared, on November 10, eight missiles were launched from Duindigt and Oude Scheveningseweg. One of the V-2s that evening malfunctioned and flew backwards and crashed near the road to Duivenvoorde castle.

   In November, a new detachment was sent to The Hague: Artillerie Ersatz Abteilung 271 (Artillery Replacement Detachment 271). Detachment 271 was originally formed to act as a buffer for the operational V-2 units. Throughout the greater part of 1944, they were responsible for training the new recruits in V-2 field operations, while at the same time; their members were available to supplement the existing operational units. In November, Detachment 271 was incorporated into Battery 444, its additional members helping finally to bring the unit to full strength. Battery 444 now comprised three operational firing platoons, a technical troop section, a fueling section, and a target acquisition and radio section.

   Ever since arriving in The Hague, the soldiers of Battery 444 had been waiting for their promised third platoon to arrive, but the third platoon was slightly different from other platoons. The personel of the first platoons were the highly-trained and highly-experienced specialists of the original Lehr- und Versuchsbatterie. The third platoon consisted mostly of men only trained recently with very little practical experience in operations. They hurriedly completed their training in K slin and fired some of the last training shots from Heidekraut. While waiting for their vehicles and equipment, they spent time in the Baumholder camp near Trier, then helped the farmers in Westerwald with the harvesting of potatoes and killed more time with some infantry exercises.

   The third platoon of Battery 444, under the command of Oberwachtmeister Haarnagel, arrived at Staatsspoor station at about 9:30 in the morning on November 15. They were taken to new quarters at Marlot, and then were sent out immediately to fire a rocket. With the addition of the third platoon, the situation for Battery 444 rocket crews in The Hague and Wassenaar had not really changed with the addition of the third platoon. All three platoons supported each other, but essentially the first two platoons of 444 operated in the same manner as before.
















    THE HAAGSE BOS AND LEIDSESTRAATWEG EXPLORED 2010, 2019, IV2RG

HOEK VAN HOLLAND

   New launching sites were chosen at Hoek van Holland, at the edge of the Nieuwe Waterweg, near the lighthouse on a new concrete road a few hundred yards east of the railway station, opposite the Rozenburg-Hoek of Holland ferry. Located about ten miles south of The Hague, the site offered few camouflage opportunities, so starting on November 15, 1944, the V-2s were almost exclusively launched under the protection of darkness. After each launch, perfect little squares were scorched into the fruit wharf and new concrete road where the firing tables had been standing southeast of the station.
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   Not far away there was another launch site in the Staelduinse Bos (at Achterlaan road). The Staelduin Forest was a wooded area on the edge of the polder, north of the defensive fortress of Hoek of Holland. Located a safe distance from the coast, the area was already sprinkled with bunkers and ammunition mazazines. After the residents of nearby farms had been rousted from their property the day before, the first launch from Staelduin occurred on November 13, 1944. There were three launch sites in the western portion of the forest, but after only a few days, heavy rainfall made the forest floor unstable. This forced the rocket crews to use the concrete road and fruit wharf areas for the time being. Over the next months, the first and second platoons of 444 occupied these sites alternately; later the crews of 485 would use the site.

   Since November 9, German armies no longer occupied Walcheren. After a sharp nine-day battle, the German commander surrendered Walcheren and 10,000 German troops to the British and Canadian forces. The water route to the port of Antwerp was now clear; Allied forces controlled all fifty-four miles of the port s seaward approaches. However, the rocket launchings went on from The Hague and its outskirts.
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PHOTOS ABOVE SHOW THE DEFENSES OF HOEK VAN HOLLAND 

   On a clear day in the northern portions of the Antwerp suburbs, soldiers and civilians could see the rockets heading for London from the Dutch coast. During the month of October, 83 rockets had been launched, of which five were failures. Some rockets blew up on their launch stands, killing and injuring crew members; some failed to ignite at all; others hung in the air for a moment, then crashed to earth and blew up or fell into the sea. Whenever Dutch civilians heard the roar of ignition, everyone would begin to count the seconds. After 30 seconds, they were safe. If the engine stopped after 30 seconds, the rocket would crash into either the North Sea or fall somewhere outside the city. However, if the roar stopped prior to 30 seconds, the missiles would fall back onto the neighborhoods of The Hague.
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   In Voorburg at Koning Wilhelminastraat, a V-2 destroyed six houses, while another rocket came down on the railway station in Wassenaar. Residents in the city watched a rocket looping over a meadow, its engine kicking off and on, with German soldiers chasing after it. It finally hit the ground and blew up. Most of the rockets exploded on impact. If the warhead did not go off, German specialists would try to defuse it. The detonation of the 2,000-pound warhead, along with the eruption of alcohol and liquid-oxygen, damaged hundreds of houses and caused many civilian casualties. Dutch intelligence put the failure rate at about eight percent. Many of the rocket crew reports coming to division headquarters sounded similar:

  
Battery 1./485, Serial No. 18374, September 22, 1944, 04:45 hours; thrust terminated shortly after liftoff, unknown reasons. Device fell back on firing table and exploded. Cause not determined.

  
Battery 444, Serial No. 18979, September 30, 1944, 15:50 hours; after a series of standard checkups, the rocket was prepared and fired as usual. At an altitude of approximately 219 meters, there was an explosion in the midsection of the tail unit, which terminated the thrust. The rocket crashed about 20 meters from the firing table. The fuel tanks exploded, the warhead simmered in the burning alcohol for 45 minutes before detonating.

  
Battery 444, Serial No. 18951, October 7, 1944; Rocket was returned to field store after preflight tests revealed problem with tail fin rudder. After inspection of the fin, the error was not clearly ascertained. Error is probably in trim motor. Since investigation requires the removal of the tail section, the device was returned.

   Although the launching batteries in The Hague hit London 82 times in November, the crews of Battery 444 and Battalion 485 had no real idea where their missiles were striking. They could only set the gyro mechanisms and hope they were accurate. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to pinpoint the V-2 impacts by using radio waves and seismology; however, in the end, the best reports came from German spies, but even those reports were suspect, as British Intelligence had turned many of the spies around. Rockets frequently broke up in the upper atmosphere, high above the North Sea. On November 12, a rocket broke up over London s Victoria Station. Astonished people saw a puff of smoke bloom in the sky, followed a few seconds later by a distant explosion and a hail of metal fragments.

   On the dismal evening of November 11, a V-2 came down near Shooters Hill in Greenwich, creating a ghastly scene. Striking a road that was filled with commuters, it left a massive hole in the roadway and consumed everything in its path. The passengers on a city bus were set ablaze when the flash ripped off the top deck and fire engulfed the remainder of the vehicle. Across the street, a local pub collapsed, crushing and then incinerating all of the customers inside. Unlike the V-1, the V-2 blast effect had a tendency to set on fire everything in the immediate area. Ruptured gas mains unleashed tremendous bluish flames that shot high into the air, creating a fiery spectacle reminiscent of a scene from Dante s Inferno. The sight was both awe-inspiring and terrifying.

   During the first week of November, 12 V-2s hit London; during the second week, 35 V-2s came down; during the third week, there were 27 V-2 incidents. Rockets had been spotted underneath the trees in the Haagse Bos, Willem de Zwijgerlaan, Zorgvliet, Kerkhoflaan, Langenhorst, and Waalsdorperweg. When the first few rockets landed on England in September, they had been little more than a nuisance. By November 14, there were about four V-2 incidents per day. As of November 20, about 210 rockets had reached England, with 95 hitting London. 456 people had been killed in London alone, with hundreds more injured. The improvement in performance was largely because the launching crews were now getting a better grade of missile. Under a new supply system called Warme Semmel, or hot cakes, rockets no longer sat in storage for weeks at a time before launching. It was hoped that by firing the rockets quickly only a few days after coming off the assembly lines the deterioration of vital parts would be prevented, thus reducing the number of failures. Furthermore, all sensitive components were fitted into the missile s body at the last minute. This made the work at the technical troop s field store considerably more important. After final assemblies and tests were completed, the missile was turned over to the launching platoons.

   At General Dornberger's headquarters in Schwedt, the transportation office planned the fastest routes for moving the rockets from the Mittelwerk directly to the front. In order to discover other potential problems, Dornberger s staff sent technical experts from Peenem nde to the launching areas to inspect and supervise the transport, handling, and delivery practices in the field. These technical crews maintained a supply of spare parts and introduced new components for the missiles. After a number of corrections, the overall rate of failures was reduced.

   On November 25, 1944, while a V-2 was being feuled in Wassenaar, people all over London were enjoying a nice shopping day. In West End, American soldiers could be spotted among those enjoying the day. In the East London district of Deptford, at the New Cross Shopping Center, it was as crowded as ever on that Saturday afternoon. Shoppers were packed into Woolworth s department store, busy choosing from the store shelves. At 12:10 PM, following a blinding flash, the Woolworth s building was shaken apart by a massive explosion. An instant later, the entire building collapsed into the basement. Everyone inside was thrown down into the cellar along with tons of beams and plaster; many were buried under the huge pile of debris as bits of material continued to flutter from the sky. 171 people were killed, 108 seriously injured. Bits of people were strewn around the rubble. Some were killed outright by the rocket s impact; others were crushed or suffocated when the building caved in. Nearby there was again a city bus, its windows and tires shattered, with rows and rows of people all covered in dust and sitting very still and very dead. Seventy bodies were pulled out of Woolworth s alone. Eleven souls were never found. It would later be known as the single worst V-2 incident in London.

   High-flying Allied bomber crews were viewing this daily onslaught of V-2s rocketing skyward towards England. On November 24, the 544th Bomb Squadron of the 384th Bomb Group, while flying at 22,000 feet, got a close look at the rockets. The B-17 and B-24 crews could easily see the fast-moving missiles and their contrails against the blackness of the upper atmosphere.

   When the number of V-2 incidents began to increase, the London population called on officials to take action to stop the attacks. As well as causing physical damage, the rockets highly affected Londoners psychologically. When compared to the V-1 flying bomb, the rocket impacts seemed almost supernatural. Since there was no time to do anything, the number killed and injured by the missiles was predictably high. A lightning bolt out of nowhere, followed by the overwhelming rush of air and ominous howl of the incoming missile. V-2s came unannounced, so most people just went to bed at night and prayed that they would be there the next morning. After hearing the bang, people could often see where the rocket had fallen by a column of smoke that would rise and hang in the air as little bits were fluttering down. On average of four people died, which was double the death rate of the Flying Bombs.

   In spite of the V-2 s reputation, it caused less disruption to daily life than the V-1 because there was no way to prepare for it. There was no warning of an impending impact. Victims were vaporized without their knowledge. Owing to its impact speed, the V-2 would burrow 30 feet into the ground before the warhead could explode, and the blast wave would annihilate everything within a quarter mile radius. The lateral blast damage was not as great as the V-1, but later it was discovered that many buildings that were thought to be intact had actually sustained substantial structural or foundation damage caused by the shockwave of impact.

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       WOOLWORTHS INCIDENT NOV. 25, 1944




RAF COUNTER-MEASURES

   The RAF s Second Tactical Air Force and Fighter Command began reconnaissance and strafing attacks on the Dutch railways almost as soon as the rockets began falling on London. Initially, the attacks proved fruitless. However, after bombing the vital arteries at Enschede, Almelo, Amersfoort, Utrecht, and Leiden and bridges at several river crossings, the RAF was able to disrupt the transports to a certain extent. Nonetheless, the Germans managed to repair the lines very quickly, even though the damage was at times considerable.


   The pilots of the RAF, namely No. 229 Squadron RAF, had been in operations against V-2 targets since September 10, 1944. On October 7, the legendary Polish 303 Squadron joined in the ground attack missions against Big Ben targets. Flying out of Coltishall, No. 602 Squadron RAF was brought in to patrol for V-2s on October 10. Also in October, No. 453 Squadron RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force), and later No. 451 Squadron RAAF, began practicing dive-bombing techniques from their base at Matlask.

   In November, the No. 453 Squadron was transferred to Swannington and equipped with new clipped-wing Spitfire Mk. XVIs. From November 1944 to March 1945, No. 453 Squadron was heavily engaged in striking at assembly and launch sites of the V-2.
A typical day for the Spitfire pilots started with an early weather reconnaissance flight over the Channel to the Dutch coastline to determine which targets would be suitable for that day. The squadrons would form up over England and head east toward The Netherlands.

   As they neared the target areas, the Spitfires would descend to attack altitude, somewhere between 8,000 to 5,000 feet, and in echelon formation, they would make their final approach to the target. A typical day for the Spitfire pilots started with an early weather reconnaissance flight over the Channel to the Dutch coastline to determine which targets would be suitable for that day. The squadrons would form up over England and head east toward The Netherlands. As they neared the target areas, the Spitfires would descend to attack altitude, somewhere between 8,000 to 5,000 feet, and in echelon formation, they would make their final approach to the target.

   One method of attack was to fly in echelon over the target until it passed out of sight below the wing, then the Spitfires would roll in and trim the aircraft into a sheer dive. The bombs were released at around 3,000 feet, which gave the pilots enough time to recover from the momentary blackout caused by the g-forces as they pulled out of the dive. They would then be required to make their low-level escape, avoiding the anti-aircraft guns in the process.

   The rocket troops would be attacked by the RAF on many occasions, although generally, not much damage was inflicted on the battery itself, as was the surrounding infrastructure. The main targets in The Hague were De Wittenburg, Duindigt, the Haagse Bos, Ockenburgh and Bloemendaal, as well as the main road leading from The Hague to Leiden.

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PHOTOS ABOVE: BIG BEN OPERATIONS 1944-45, NO. 602 SQDN. RAF, NO.. 453 SQDN. RAAF



"CLIPPED-WING" SUPERMARINE SPITFIRE MARK XVI

   The rocket trains from the east carried mounted anti-aircraft guns onboard, while the battery road transport units in Leiden and The Hague were protected by mobile half-tracks carrying 3.7 cm anti-aircraft flak guns. Additional anti-aircraft guns were positioned in defenses of the Atlantic Wall. Nevertheless, the RAF attacks were conducted at extreme speeds, right through the hail of anti-aircraft fire. After dropping their bombs, they strafed other targets and then took off, disappearing just as fast as they had arrived. These days were exhausting for the RAF pilots. During clear weather, a single squadron could mount many sorties per day.

   Besides attacking the launching sites, the large railway junctions to the east were bombed daily in an attempt to destroy the V-2 supply lines. However, the lines were repaired rapidly by the thousands of forced laborers employed by the Germans. Even though the RAF slowed deliveries, the trains with rockets and fuels continued to make it through to The Hague.

   On November 17, 1944, the Air Ministry released a report describing the operations of Fighter Command against V-2s. The report was not encouraging. The worsening weather was hampering ground attacks. When not grounding aircraft, it obscured the target areas. Furthermore, the requirement not to risk Dutch civilian casualties was prohibiting operations in built up areas. Meanwhile, Londoners were suffering from the rocket attacks, so the report requested this restriction be reconsidered. Following the report, Allied air forces increased reconnaissance flights over The Hague, conducting hundreds of sorties to locate V-weapon targets, with frequent tips from the Dutch underground.


   Members of the Dutch Resistance learned very quickly that if a Meillerwagen trailer arrived in the area, along with the rest of the battery s vehicles, it was the sure sign of an impending launch. The rocket troops knew the underground was watching, because the fighter-bombers came soon after each round was fired to attack the German positions. All along the Rijksstraatweg, the road north from The Hague through Wassenaar, foxholes had been dug for quick shelter in case of air attack. At one place along the road, a large sign informed pedestrians Attention! Strafing attacks; foxholes on left. Dutch civilians were even subject to attack if they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Soon the rocket crews realized that the launch vehicles were giving away their intentions. In December, a camouflage platoon was added to each firing platoon. Field training now emphasized camouflage for concealing the tankers and trailers from the air. Vehicles that remained in the launching areas were dug in and covered with concealment netting; the rest were dispersed and hidden in the woods.

   Between October and November, the U.S. Army Air Force and Fighter Command flew more than ten thousand sorties against railways and road transportations, between Den Haag and Leiden, and around the Hoek van Holland. Fighter Command flew 600 more from British airfields, much of the work done by the Spitfire, employed as a fighter-bomber. Allied fighters caught two trains just from the Central Works factory at the end of November. The trains carried 40 missiles between them - all 40 rockets were scrapped.

   As early as September, British intelligence was informed of the offloading stations in Leiden Station Heerensingel and the Leiden Centraal Station. However, the Bombing Commission in London was ignorant of the actual logistical situations of the enemy and often consulted the reports from the Dutch Resistance. Because of the risk to Dutch lives and property, the Resistance urged attacks on railways exclusively. In a meeting on November 21, 1944, representatives of the Dutch government, met with Fighter Command s Air Marshal Hill and other Air Ministry figures. The result of the meeting was a general agreement for increased efforts against the V-2, along with the loosening of the severe attack standards over the Netherlands. Fighter Command would now be allowed to attack V-2 targets in the middle of densely populated areas provided these targets could be distinguished reasonably well. The same day people in Leiden observed many RAF Spitfires flying around the city. Fighter Command had sent 36 aircraft to harass the V-2 positions in Wassenaar and Leiden. An attack on V-2 launch and storage sites at Wassenaar was mounted by the No. 453 Squadron RAAF, while to the north more Spitfires hunted targets near Leiden. With air raid sirens wailing, the anti-aircraft batteries hammered out shells from both sides of the city. After a few diving attacks on the transports outside of Leiden, the Spitfires left the area around 4:00 PM.

   On behalf of German authorities, the mayor of Wassenaar issued a statement at the beginning of December, which ordered, from 5 December, all street entrances, as well as sheds and garages close to through-going roads, must remain open. These measures were to provide shelter for the V-2 transports from prowling fighter-bombers or Allied reconnaissance aircraft. To mark the shelters, white planks or bales of straw were to be placed on both sides of the entrances, and wherever sheds were not available, the immediate vicinity of the house was to be kept free so that vehicles could be hidden. This order applied for the main roads of Van Zuylen van Nijenveltstraat, Rijksstraatweg, Katwijkseweg, Warmond, and Voorschoten.


   On Sunday December 10, 1944, Fighter Command ordered an attack on rocket targets in the The Hague and Leiden area. The first attack by No. 229 Squadron was aimed at Station Heerensingel in Leiden. The bombs missed their intended target and fell on the civilian houses west of the station. Later that day, Spitfires attacked the V-2 personnel located at the Hotel Promenade at Scheveningen. The pilots laid down four bombs, which detonated directly at either end of the hotel.

   The following day, December 11, units from the Second Tactical Air Force, based in Belgium, flew multiple attacks against the shelters of the Leiden Centraal Station. The pilots of 257 Squadron, flying the heavily armed Hawker Typhoon IB, reported good results against V-2 targets. However, 263 Squadron reported their bombs had overshot the target. Thick black smoke was seen over the target and along with intense German flak. Again, the bombs ended up hitting the densely populated neighborhoods near the station. Numerous homes were completely destroyed in the disaster, resulting in hundreds of individuals finding themselves without shelter and facing uncertainty. Tragically, fifty-four lives were lost during this devastating event, and a significant number of others sustained injuries, requiring medical care and support in the aftermath.

   Also on December 11, Spitfires from No. 602 Squadron dive-bombed Staatsspoor Station in the center of The Hague, where another liquid-oxygen offloading station was reported. As the Spitfires loomed overhead, Vierling Flak guns positioned at Malieveld opened fire from the southern end of the Haagse Bos. The pilots witnessed four bombs hit the east end of the station awning, from which a thick cloud of white smoke and fragments rose into the air. Four more bombs fell in the center of the target area among trucks and railway buildings, approximately 100 yards from the station. Other bombs detonated on the railway tracks less than 50 yards further to the east. By the end of December, many of the RAF pilots were flying the new clipped-wing Spitfire Mark XVIs, employed as a fighter-bomber.

   Because of the raids, for a short period in January 1945, some of the V-2 trains moved on from Leiden through Wassenaar for offloading at the Hollandsspoor and Staatsspoor stations, closer to The Hague. Further attacks on the supply lines from Leiden proved difficult. Hitting the stations and the small bridges was almost impossible. By February, the RAF s attempt to affect V-2 transport lines ended. If the RAF had mounted a continuing series of air attacks on the Leiden railway installations, it probably would have immensely hampered the German V-2 efforts and slowed the rate of fire dramatically but it also would have destroyed many more lives and ruined the historic city.

More about the bombing raids on Leiden >

   Britain s Air Ministry decided that bombing liquid-oxygen factories might succeed where other attempts to stop the missiles had failed. Experts drew up a list of eighteen factories that manufactured liquid-oxygen. Ten factories were inside Germany, another eight were in the Netherlands. The company NV Centrale Ammoniak Fabriek at 23 Stammersdijk at Weesperkarspel was a supplier in the Netherlands. Another company in Amsterdam, NV Maatschappij tot explotatie der cg Remmenhullersche Koolzuur en Zuurstoffabriek, at 271 Kerkstraat, also delivered liquid-oxygen. The companies, Gist en Spiritus fabriek and De Destilleerderij en Roomgist fabriek, at 17 Turfmarkt, Delft, delivered alcohol. The eight plants in the Netherlands had been built in residential areas. Attacking these factories would require pinpoint accuracy. Even the slightest bombing error might result in hundreds of civilian deaths. For this reason, only one of the liquid-oxygen factories was bombed. Only two of the German plants were attacked, but these attacks had no effect upon the supply of liquid-oxygen to the rocket launching crews.













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    PHOTOS ABOVE SHOW DAMAGE CAUSED BY RAF FIGHTER COMMAND AND THE 2ND
     TACTICAL AIR FORCE ATTACKS ON LEIDEN ON DECEMBER 10 AND 11, 1944.



SCHEVENINGEN

   On December 9, around 2:00 PM, a rocket launched from Duindigt by Battery 444 flew backwards and came down on Admiral de Ruijterlaan (now Queen Wilhelminalaan) in Voorburg-North. At first, the launch seemed to be on course, but after a short time there was an explosion and the missile came apart in pieces. A portion of the V-2 changed direction and then fattened in a horizontal direction toward the south. With parts ripping loose, the forward section of the rocket hit northern house numbers 291 to 301 on Admiral de Ruijterlaan. The lower section of the rocket fell short into grasslands. The warhead bounded free and did not explode, but a blazing fire was ignited when the remaining alcohol spread down on the front of houses on both sides of the street. As the fire ravaged the homes, a German crew recovered the warhead and took it away. A two year-old girl was killed and six others were wounded.

   With the renewed efforts of stepped up Allied air attacks the air raid sirens sounded many times each day for the rocket troops. In spite of the many attempts to stop the launchings, only rocket malfunctions and an occasional errant shot kept the missiles from falling in Britain. An average of four or five V-2s hit London every day during the early part of December, with as many hitting the neighboring county of Essex, just to the east. At the beginning of December a rocket came down in the River Thames, not far from London s Savoy Hotel. It sent a huge geyser of muddy water high into the air, and blew out windows all up and down the riverfront. Later that day, Londoners gathered on Waterloo Bridge and the river embankment to stare at the spot where the rocket struck.

   Prior to the war, Scheveningen was the largest coastal resort in the Netherlands. It was visited by thousands of Dutch tourists every month. By 1910, it had become one of Europe s most fashionable resorts. It featured a broad seafront boulevard, prestigious hotels, and a concrete pier with tourist facilities, and was located about three and a half miles from the center of The Hague. Sadly, following the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands in 1940, the seafront had become embroiled in Hitler s Atlantic Wall. The Hague served as the seat of the German occupation forces during the war, and was therefore under special protection. The construction of new defenses began in 1942, which drastically changed the city s appearance. A strip of land in the city was designated for defensive fortifications against a possible Allied invasion. Many homes had to be demolished and entire sections of the old Scheveningen were leveled to make way for the construction. On March 26, 1943, the old Wandelhoofd Wilhelmina (the Pier of Scheveningen) was destroyed by fire. It remains uncertain whether it was actually the Germans or the Dutch Resistance that took the action of destroying the pier. The specifics are ambiguous, leaving room for speculation about which party was responsible for the demolition.
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PHOTOS BELOW SHOW SCHEVENINGEN RESORT AREA, INCLUDING THE PIER AND KURHAUS HOTEL, NIEUWE PARKLAAN, SCHEVENINGEN BOS, WESTBROEKPARK, AND KERLHOFLAAN




















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   Scheveningen was given the status of St tzpunkgruppe Scheveningen, a fortress with the ability to defend itself independently. On the boulevard there was an anti-tank wall and on the beach were placed many obstacles, such as barbed wire, minefields and tank barriers. Bunkers and gun batteries lined the beachfront and formed a continuous 2,600-meter long barrier. German command posts occupied the remaining buildings. The defense lines of fortress areas were enclosed on the east by the large anti-tank ditch, which weaved its way through the city. On the sea, the dunes, and the beach and seawall walls, formed a good barrier against tanks. All passages through the dunes, as well as the exits and stairways from the promenade to the beach were closed. The majority Scheveningen residents were forced to move out, although some people were still living inside the fortress boundaries. Many vacant government buildings were occupied by German army units and administrative services.

   Arthur Seyss-Inquart, former Chancellor and Reichsstatthalter of Austria, left his post as Deputy Governor of occupied Poland in May 1940. Following the capitulation of the Low Countries Hitler had appointed Seyss-Inquart as Reichskommissar for the Occupied Netherlands. Seyss-Inquart was charged with directing the civil administration, with creating economic collaboration with the German Reich. He supported the Dutch NSB and allowed them to create the paramilitary Nederlandse Landwacht, which acted as an auxiliary police force. The administration of the country was controlled by Seyss-Inquart himself and he answered directly to Hitler. He introduced measures to counter the Dutch Resistance, and authorized around 800 executions, although some reports put the total at over 1,500 including the reprisal executions of 117 Dutchmen for the attack on SS and Police Leader Hanns Albin Rauter. Although most of his powers were transferred to Dutch military commanders and the Gestapo in July 1944, he remained a powerful figure. Seyss-Inquart, a fervent anti-Semite, was responsible for the deportation of thousands of Dutch Jews. The Jewish community in The Hague, the second largest in the Netherlands, was almost completely exterminated. Of the 140,000 registered Dutch Jews, only 30,000 survived the war.


ST TZPUNKGRUPPE SCHEVENINGEN

   In 1940 the headquarters of Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart, had been established in the government district of The Hague near the Binnenhof. By 1943, because of increasing Allied air raids on German command centers, most government departments moved out of The Hague. Seyss-Inquart obtained permission from Hitler to stay, as a show of German authority, despite the threat of air attacks. To protect his headquarters, a second high-security militarised zone St tzpunktgruppe Clingendael was created. For the safety of Seyss-Inquart, two new bunkers were constructed on the Clingendael estate.


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HOUSE CLINGENDAEL AND THE SEYSS-INQUART BUNKER WERE SITUATED NEAR THE SS POLICE BARRACKS AND THE FILMSTAD

   The main bunker was a large anti-aircraft bunker on the border with the Oosterbeek estate, which was disguised as
an ordinary farmhouse. Located just north of the new SS police barracks at Clingendael (Princess Juliana Barracks), the concrete walls and ceiling of the new bunker would be several meters-thick.


  
The exterior was disguised with painted bricks and there were two phony chimneys on the roof concealing 2 cm flak guns. Nearby at House Clingendael, where Seyss-Inquart stayed as well, a smaller air raid shelter was constructed. He maintained another bunker within the extensive military complex situated in Apeldoorn, which can be found in the eastern region of the Netherlands and was notably distant from The Hague.

   Fronting Benoordenhoutseweg were prominent flak batteries, along with defensive bunkers built on the adjacent Oosterbeek estate to defend the anti-tank ditch and the command bunker. Together, the two defensive zones, St tzpunkgruppe Scheveningen-Clingendael, became Seyss-Inquart s personal fortress. The area contained as many as 6,000 German troops and large amounts of new equipment and supplies. The fortress areas were particularly appealing to the troops involved in the V-2 rocket operations because they provided not only easy access for launching and transporting the rockets but also a high level of security that was essential for conducting their missions secretly and safely. The smooth and efficient functioning of their activities and processes flourished and prospered specifically because they were situated in areas that offered both a high degree of safety and straightforward ease of entry.
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ST TZPUNKGRUPPE SCHEVENINGEN AND THE SPERRGEBIET,

SEYSS-INQUART AT THE BOTTOM



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FORTRESS CLINGENDAEL

   Scheveningen soon became another position of the technical troop s field store. Beginning on December 13, the Ford Halle, or Ford CAB (Centraal Auto Bedruf) garage, in Scheveningen was being used for storage of V-2 battery vehicles. The garage was situated at 135 Gevers Deynootstraat, behind the sheds of the HTM street trams, where civilians had been evacuated. The Dutch Resistance reported that at least 14 Meillerwagen trailers had been seen outside of the garage. A variety of different types of equipment and several vehicles were stored securely in the nearby Kurhaus garage, as well as in the sheds owned by HTM located in the vicinity.

   During the war, a branch of the Dutch railway system extended to the evacuated resort area, connecting it to the Hofpleinlijn station and enhancing access to this strategic location. In April 1943, the Hoflein track between the Renbaan-Achterweg stop and Scheveningen was dismantled to make way for the Atlantic Wall. There was limited train service on the usable part of the route until late 1944. After this, much of the rolling stock was requisitioned and English bombing raids destroyed much of the route. The materials unloading station was located at the intersection of Hartenhoekweg and Zwolschestraat, while the assembly and transfer point for the V-2 technical and firing troops was located at Villa Bella Vista, on the Scheveningen Promenade. Ford Halle also served an important role as a transfer point.

   In the early months of V-2 operations, staff were based at van Stolkweg 21 near the Scheveningen woods. By December, headquarters moved to Hotel Trianon on Nieuwe Paarlaan, near the Kurhaus, where many crew members stayed in nearby hotels. Southeast, across from Haagse Bos, SS security forces were housed to protect SS and Police Leader Hanns Albin Rauter and Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart. This group occupied properties next to SS headquarters in Clingendael, including Princess Juliana Barracks at Oosterbeek. Benoordenhoutseweg functioned as a major thoroughfare leading in a northeastern direction towards the towns of Wassenaar and Leiden. In addition to being a vital roadway, nearby lodging was available for the rocket crews.


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OPERATION BACKFIRE FILM 1945
"AVENUE OF TREES" AT STADHOUDERSLAAN AND GEMEENTE-MUNICIPAL MUSEUM
   In the first weeks of September, V-2s were launched from the Zorgvliet woods and from the Avenue of Trees at Stadhouderslaan, in front of the Gemeente-Municipal Museum. On December 8, 1944, one of the platoons from Battery 444 had set up a rocket on the tramway line in front of the museum.

   At 5:55 AM, the V-2 exploded on the launch table upon ignition. The blast left a smoking hole in the middle of Stadhouderslaan and had a devastating effect on the museum building. Almost all the glass panes were broken, window frames were knocked out and the water in reflecting pool was expelled. The crater from this explosion is visible in the British Operation Backfire film from late 1945. Luckily, the museum collections had been moved previously to storage locations throughout the country. At the time of the rocket incident, the museum galleries were used to store confiscated household goods from the demolished and vacant houses in the Scheveningen fortress area.

   By December 15, launch sites were prepared at new locations. These included a site near Kasteel (castle) Oud Poelgeest at Rijswijk, and another site at van Vredenburgweg near Huize te Werve. All traffic would be cleared from the selected roadway just before launch. The rocket units moved to a new site every few days. Most of the launching sites were chosen in woods or park clearings. A tree-lined street running through The Hague or through Wassenaar was an ideal launching site. Most were accessible to all launch vehicles and provided natural camouflage for the rockets. In Scheveningen, the organized evacuation of civilians played a significant role in decreasing the chances of Resistance forces conducting surveillance in the area. This reduction created an environment where the V-2 rocket crews could proceed with their operations in a manner that was relatively undisturbed and free from the constant threat of being monitored or interrupted.

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"AVENUE OF TREES" AT STADHOUDERSLAAN










                                            THE RIJSWIJK FOREST PROVIDED ACCESSIBLE AND CAMOUFLAGED LAUNCHING SITES
   In mid-December 1944, the last platoon of the 2./485 was withdrawn to Burgsteinfurt in Germany. On December 17, the entire battery of 1./485 arrived in The Hague to reinforce the rocket fire and immediately settled into Ockenburgh and Bloemendaal and began launching on December 19. At approximately the same time, for motives known only to Kammler, Hauptmann M ller, who held the position of commander of Battery 444, was unexpectedly relieved from his duties. Subsequently, he was reassigned to the V-2 training school located in K slin, where he took on the role of an instructor, presumably to share his expertise and experience with the next generation of personnel. Following his departure, Hauptmann Basse stepped in to fill the vacancy left by M ller. Basse had previously served as the commander of the 91 Technical Battery, bringing his own background and knowledge to the leadership of Battery 444.

   V-2 officials from rocket training school at K slin often visited The Hague to examine the actual situation of rocket transportation and fuel handling within the operational areas. They wanted to compare the logistics of actual operations with the training approach given at the school. It was found that situations for supply in cities such as The Hague were far different that those of the batteries in rural locations. Possibly, Kammler believed M ller s knowledge of field operations might be better employed at K slin. The Wehrmacht had no say in the matter. By the end of 1944, SS General Kammler had swallowed up all former aspects of Wehrmacht involvement in V-2 operations.

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   In The Hague, the SS security service had recruited a number of Dutch agents who were now in the employment of the Sicherheitsdienst. These Dutch agents, who had infiltrated some of the Resistance cells in The Hague, were known to the rocket troops as V-Leute. On December 18, the Dutch Resistance reported that close to a hundred rockets were seen lying underneath the trees of the Haagse Bos at the corner of Leidsestraatweg. A few days later, an intercepted report from the V-Leute indicated that a Resistance message had been intercepted. The Resistance had informed the SOE in London regarding Battery 444 s sleeping accommodations. In December, Battery 444 soldiers were billeted in apartments at Marlot Park Fliet, just south of Wassenaar, close to the firing locations in Wassenaar and Duindigt. Because of the looming peril of an attack by the RAF, the rocket troops were immediately evacuated from Marlot and moved to new lodgings in the areas of Clingendael and Wassenaar, outside Voorlinden. Soon, it became clear that Marlot was under immediate threat, as suspected.

   The Dutch resistance was well organized. It could quickly supply reliable data on launch sites, storage sites, and housing to London. The main resistance groups were the Albrecht group and the Packard group, both of which collaborated with the Intelligence Office in London. J. W. H. Uytenbogaart, a professor at Delft, was a member of the Resistance as well. He had had already studied the theory of rocket ballistics prior to the war. Uytenbogaart was able to report on the launch sites of the V-2s since he lived in a villa on Bloemcamplaan, a short distance east of Duindigt in Wassenaar. Because of this unusual coincidence, the British intelligence agencies were provided with a lot of technical information about the V-2 as well as constant updates on the launch sites. The Germans were also active. A good indication of what the Allied intelligence services knew about the V-2 activities in The Hague was uncovered by the German side s active participation in intercepting messages and arresting resistance fighters.

   By mid-December 1944, severe cold had gripped Low Countries. This was followed by a period of fog. On December 16, the German armies launched their last major offensive of the war in the west, Operation Autumn Mist, also known as the Ardennes Offensive or the Battle of the Bulge, an attempt to push the Allied front line west from northern France to northwestern Belgium. On December 20, 1944, rockets were fitted with warheads near Leidsestraatweg in the Haagse Bos, opposite the Filmstad in Oosterbeek. By December 23, the weather had cleared. On Sunday, December 24, the RAF quickly mounted air raids against Marlot, the Staatsspoor station, and another station at Laan van Nieuw Oost-Indi . Thirty-seven RAF Spitfires from No. 303, No. 229, and No. 602 Squadrons launched pinpoint air attacks on these targets. At Marlot, according to Air Ministry War Room Daily Operational Summaries, the 500-pound and 250-pound bombs landed precisely on target during the first attack around 10:45 AM. Four villas of the occupied southern portion of the Marlot complex were destroyed, with hardly any damage to other nearby properties.

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SS GENERAL HANS KAMMLER

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                                     PHOTOS: RAF RAID OF DECEMBER 24, 1944, SPITFIRES OVER MARLOT AND THE RESULTING DAMAGE
   Only the security group and a few other German soldiers were present at Marlot during the attack. According to the Resistance, one soldier was killed and three others were injured. One of the Spitfires had been shot down, and when security personnel found the wreckage of this plane, they discovered in the cockpit a picture of the Marlot residences with the rocket soldiers quarters circled in red ink. It was evident that the Dutch workers employed within the Sperrgebiet were actively engaged in espionage on behalf of the Resistance movement. The Germans were impressed by the remarkable  precision and accuracy demonstrated during the RAF raid. However, they felt a sense of dismay and disappointment over the unfortunate loss of their beloved Christmas tree, as well as the interruption of their carefully planned dinner festivities.

   Unexpectedly, SS General Kammler arrived by car that same evening, just as cleanup efforts in the area of Marlot were getting underway. He was fortunate not to show up a few hours earlier, right in the midst of the Spitfire attacks. Apparently, he wanted to surprise the rocket crews at their scheduled party that evening. Improvising, he traveled into the darkness, driving through the Wassenaar neighborhoods with Hauptmann Basse to find the men in their new accommodations. At various billets along the streets Buurtweg near Voorlinden and the homes along Laan van Koot, there were small, impromptu celebrations going on. The SS-Obergruppenf hrer paid each of them a visit, passing out cigarettes and chocolates, while commending their fortitude in the face of setbacks and extolling the success of the latest German offensive in the Ardennes.

   The Christmas Day heavy frost kept the V-2 troops at rest. The batteries did not fire any rockets this day due to lack of available V-2s and the shortage of liquid-oxygen. Operations did not start again until the following evening with the launch of five missiles after 9:00 PM. The command post was relocated to the neighborhood of Oud Clingendael and the adjoining estate De Stille Hoek following the bombing of Marlot. The Voorlinden House north of Buurtweg served as the location of frequent gatherings.

  
These were hectic times for the rocket troops. The quick British fighter-bombers were generally free to conduct their strikes as they saw appropriate. The light anti-aircraft guns attached to the batterie s defense were insufficient, but naturally, the guns positioned in the Sperrgebiet s fortified zones supplemented these. Nevertheless, the lack of German air defenses, and the infrequent presence of German fighter aircraft overhead to protect the launching zones, gave the British aircraft almost complete freedom of manoeuvre. Because of the rapid loss of liquid-oxygen due to evaporation, the rocket crews had to continue with launch preparations despite hostile aircraft patrolling above. Even so, the RAF pilots had a hard time detecting the firing crews even when they were flying immediately overhead. Several times V-2s rose directly in front of the astonished pilots, causing their aircraft to shake from the pressure wave created by the rocket s exhaust. Launch operations increasingly took place at night, when fighter-bomber patrols were absent.

   On Boxing Day, December 26, 70 people were killed and 168 injured, when a V-2 launched by Battery 444 at Duindigt came down in the middle of Mackenzie Road, Islington (London) around 8:26 PM. The crowded Prince of Wales pub, packed with revelers, collapsed into the cellar. Eighteen houses were demolished; another 20 in the surrounding streets were heavily damaged.

   By the end of December, due to brisk activity from RAF aircraft, no work commenced in the launching positions during the daylight hours. The firing and fueling crews waited until nightfall to begin their operations. Hauptmann B hm of Battery 444 reported that three firing platoons were in operation, each using one firing point. Two platoons fired from The Hague, while the third platoon operated at Hoek van Holland. In addition, there is a security battery consisting of flak and barricade teams located near the operational sites with one flak installation is close behind the battery command post, north of Duindigt. Also operating from Hoek van Holland, was a single platoon from 1./485, while the other platoons of 1./485 were in action at Ockenburgh and Bloemendaal. By the end of December, new launching sites had been preparred at Ockenburgh/Ockenrode.

   In December and January the two portions of the 5./91 Technical Battery the Spitzenmontage (warhead assembly) and the Pr fbetrieb (testing troops) were located respectively in the woods of the Haagse Bos and in the large halls of the Filmstad at Oosterbeek. Also stationed at Oosterbeek/Clingendael was a portion of the transportation team Kraftfahr-Abteilung 900.

   In the decade before the war, film tycoon Loet C. Barnstijn (1880-1953) founded a motion picture production company in The Hague. The Filmstad (Film City) was built on the wooded property of Oosterbeek Park in 1935 after he acquired a portion of the park at Clingendael. After building two large production halls, the company enjoyed a period of successful film making in the late 1930 s, but when the Germans invaded the Netherlands in May 1940 the studio was transferred to the Universal Film AG (UFA). Afterwards, Nazi propaganda films were produced by this state-owned German film company, and the company was renamed UFA Filmstadt Den Haag. Several years later, when construction began on the Atlantic Wall fortifications, the studio closed. Due to its location in the restricted area of Fortress Clingendael, it could no longer be used for filmmaking. Soon the large anti-tank ditch was dug out along the eastern side of Clingendael and Oosterbeek. Three concrete bunkers and a workshop were also constructed along the defensive perimeter. When World War II broke out, due to his Jewish background, Barnstijn fled to the United States. He remained there for the duration of the war.

   At the offloading points, the rocket equipment and fuels were handled by transportation teams and then driven by Kraftfahr-Abteilung 900 to the 5./91 Technical Battery at the Filmstad. There, the rockets were tested and the warheads were attached. The technical battery location was heavily camouflaged. It was spread amongst various bunkers and small fortified buildings consisting of an office, storerooms, and a workshop. The testing and compressor cars were located inside the two large film studios. On average, a single rocket could be tested in 60-90 minutes. With two test stations, about 8 to 12 rockets could be readied in one night. The large halls made it possible to work in lighted conditions. Soon, the firing platoons would collect the rockets from the technical troops. The rockets were loaded onto Meillerwagen trailers and then towed to respective firing positions. Operating at night, the technical battery supplied all the firing positions of 1./485 and Battery 444.

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PREWAR FILM PRODUCTION
IN
THE GREAT HALL OF THE FILMSTAD


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PHOTOS ABOVE SHOW  FACILITIES AT UFA FILMSTADT DEN HAAG

NEW YEARS EVE

   In the final days of 1944, the rocket crews were hampered by miserable, wet and stormy weather. Even so, Battery 444, in an effort to add to the holiday festivities in London, decided they would send a New Year s Eve surprise by launching three rockets simultaneously. Because of the Allied attack on the battery s billets at Marlot on Christmas Eve, and because of the continued bombing of German cities during the holiday season, it was decided to organize a response. The idea was, as the Big Ben clock tower rang in the New Year at midnight, the chimes would be augmented by V-2 bangs rumbling across the city. This action would require all three platoons of Battery 444 to coordinate their attacks in order for the rockets to end their 5-minute journey by slamming into London together just past midnight. On the evening of December 31, each of the three firing platoons received two rockets pre-tested by the technical battery.

   The first platoon of Battery 444 was supposed to fire from Hoek van Holland, and second and third platoon would launch from Duindigt. As the appointed time approached the crews began their preparations, but because of stormy weather and high winds, the V-2 crews at Hoek van Holland were forced to cancel their operations and had to de-fuel their rocket and take it down.

   At Duindigt, the conditions were tolerable for the second and third platoons. Preparations began in the early evening. The second platoon s launching table was set up on the path in front of House Duindigt, while the third platoon was situated about 200 meters north on another path in the park. Reportedly, both of the rockets carried disparaging chalked caricatures of the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill scribbled on their hulls, alongside other notes expressing unfriendly holiday messages. As the appointed launch time approached, the crews of the second platoon could see their rocket standing in the shadow of the house.

   Soon the crews retreated to a safe distance, while the firing commander entered the Feuerleitpanzer control vehicle some 150 meters away. The two rockets lifted off simultaneously at 11:56 PM. One rocket rose from its launch table and then abruptly fell into House Duindigt, destroying it. Thousands of liters of alcohol and liquid-oxygen poured out of the crushed tanks and set the house on fire, which disappeared in a sea of flames. Some of the battery vehicles were parked near the house and these were also incinerated.


   The second V-2 was soaring in the direction British capital, but it did not make it far before it exploded over the German occupied restricted zone. It came down two and a half kilometers from Duindigt at Van Voorschotenlaan, near Waalsdorperweg, digging a huge crater of 30 meters. A nearby hospital, known as the Bronovo, lost 2,000 panes of glass when the rocket hit the earth. The German occupation forces on Van Voorschotenlann were forced to evacuate due to the raging fires. The crews at Duindigt had to walk back to their billets, where they received a holiday treat of tea and rum toddy. Two hours later, after the winds had subsided, the third platoon of Battery 444 launched another V-2 from Hoek van Holland. This rocket was also a failure. In the end, the result of the planned operation for New Year s Eve was a fiasco. Quickly, the failed attempts on New Year s Eve became known to every man in Battery 444. Even SS-Obergruppenf hrer Kammler inquired about the launches, but he was erroneously told the launches were postponed because of technical reasons.

   Note: Until recently, according to various books and websites, it was reported that the launch failure that occurred on New Year s Eve of 1944-45 had destroyed the Roomhuis-Chateau Bleu on Leidsestraatweg in the Haagse Bos. Chateau Bleu was also reported to be the launch site for this failure, manned by the second platoon of Battery 444. In 2020 an old film emerged showing the demolition of Chateau Bleu in 1943 to make way for fields of fire in the defensive positions of the Fortress St tzpunkgruppe Scheveningen-Clingendael. Dates on aerial photographs also called into question the validity of the Chateau Bleu story. This meant there was a possibility of confusion of the veteran s memories as to where this event actually occurred. Through further scrutiny of their statements, and by checking these against the recorded launches and ancillary evidence, the IV2RG determined that the so-called destroyed little castle was the manor (Huize Duindigt) on the grounds of the Duindigt estate and not the Chateau Bleu. Both the second platoon (site 77) and the third platoon (site 74) of Battery 444 were in operation at Duindigt that evening with the firing positions about 200 meters apart. The first platoon was operating at Hoek van Holland (site 70).

Destruction of House Duindigt, Eyewitness Account of Heinz Krings:

   Heinz Krings served in the second firing platoon of Battery 444 at Huize Duindigt and recorded a detailed eyewitness account of the destruction of House Duindigt on New Year's Eve 1944, caused by a failed V-2 rocket launch. Although he misidentified the incident's location, his description closely aligns with the details of House Duindigt. In his account, he writes:

   It was 09:00 PM in the [estate park at Wassenaar] [Duindigt]. The branches of the trees were barely moving in the gentle evening breeze. A sentry, his rifle on his shoulder, walked calmly around two giant projectiles that rested on trailers on the gravel. The sentry looked small in comparison to the sleeping giants. Further on, the music of the Egmont Overture echoed from the high, open entrance of the feudal mansion, whose solid oak doors had already been broken by previous missile launches. The pale light of the moon poured through the skylight and reflected on the black and white tiles in the hall. A young sergeant was waiting inside the cold hall, the collar of his coat turned up. Outside the house, a truck stopped, its brakes squealing. A dozen soldiers jumped onto the gravel. The calmness of the winter night was disturbed as toolboxes were offloaded and swung open. Soon, the hum of a slow-moving tractor rattled over the gravel. Behind the tractor, the canvas-covered missile was resting on the long Meillerwagen trailer.

   The commander ordered; Stop! A group of three to four men rushed forward and free the trailer from the tractor, which drove away quickly with its engine roaring. With the sound of the engine pump buzzing, the hydraulic arm of the erector slowly raised the heavy rocket. When the missile was nearly vertical, the canvas tarpaulin slid off with a rustle. The gray-green body of the missile was revealed. From the top, at the tip of the ignition tube, a red light flashed on. In order to determine the perpendicular position of the projectile, the men of the measuring troop aimed their theodolites at this light. Almost no order was needed for the takeoff preparations to proceed, as the experienced crews knew what they had to do.


   Everyone in the battery knew about the planned simultaneously firings on New Year s Eve and wanted to be ready at exactly 12:00 PM midnight. Before every launch, there was already a tremendous tension but this evening it was almost unbearable. The mechanics foreheads were ornamented with tiny lamps that reflect a pale light. The haunting sight of the tiny lamps flashing around the skin of the rocket was eerie. From the open valve of the rocket, they could hear compressed air as it flowed into the tanks. Further away, from somewhere on the estate, the generator that supplies the power was humming its monotonous song.

   From the work platform mounted high on the Meillerwagen s arm, an engineer made final checks. From his perch, some twelve meters above the ground, he could see far into the clear winter night. Looking south towards Hoek van Holland he could see, every now and then, the flickering fire from the anti-aircraft guns on the coast. Downstairs, the mechanics trotted about eagerly with their lamps on their foreheads finishing their preparations. Once the rocket had passed the examination, the engineer in charge lifted the phone and called for the column of fuel tankers.

   During another conversation, he heard from the personnel of the other launch platoon a second rocket stood some 200 meters away they were just as far along in their preparations. The command Zeit l uft, was given. The clock had started. As every minute passed, the excitement and tension rose. The troops had only one overwhelming question would everything go well? It was seventeen minutes to midnight.

   Meanwhile, in the firing control car [Feuerleitpanzer] the countdown clock clicked uninterrupted. All the tanks were filled. X minus 4 minutes, came the call over the phone. X minus 7 minutes, replied the leader of the second launch platoon. As luck would have it, there was a difference of three minutes because of some difficulty with a stuck valve at the second launching position. Lastly, the cable mast was erected into the launching platform. The plug connecting external power cable was hanging from the top of the rocket. The mast would collect this cable as it was released from the side of the rocket at ignition. With the rockets standing on their own, the tractors pulled the Meillerwagens away from both launching sites. The final launch site preparations were made. X minus 3 minutes, Platz r umen, came the order from the commander to clear the area. The mechanics hurriedly grabbed their toolboxes and fled in the direction of the Feuerleitpanzer, which was about 150 meters away.

  
When the engineer in charge left the launch site, he slammed the heavy door behind him as he stepped into the armored firing control car. Inside the sloping walls of the car, the smell of alcohol permeated the interior of the cabin. As the two technicians sat behind the controls at their switchboards, the commander opened the hatch and peered out at the launch site. He saw the breathing rocket standing in the shadow of the tall house. As he reached for the field telephone handset, he heard the leader of the neighboring platoon give his code name and signal, Everything is clear here! X minus eins, one minute remained, the hum of the timer could be heard in the armored car.


  
Soon, the control lamp turned to red. Startschl ssel auf schiessen, ordered the officer in the dome. The switch was heard to click five times at normal speed and each time a bright green light showed. The valves of the rocket engine were switched on. A faint bang proved that the ignition had occurred. A few seconds later, the last phase regularly occurred and the first flames leaked from the rear. Then it was time for full thrust, Hauptstufe!
 

   With a deafening noise, huge flames burst from the rear of the rocket as the turbo pumps engaged. Everything in the surrounding area was lit up like daylight. As the engineer slammed the dome hatch above him, the technicians stared with wide-open eyes at the projectile. The gigantic body of the rocket began to move, rising barely a few feet from the firing table before it fell obliquely to the side of the tall house.


   The explosion pressed the men in the control car against the walls. The mechanics watching from a distance were thrown to the ground. Two tremendous explosions ripped the stillness of the night and echoed across the Wassenaar district. Alcohol and liquid oxygen flowed from cracked tanks and set the house on fire until it disappeared in one big conflagration as the flames rose many meters high. A few seconds later, a distant roar from the other launch site was heard. This missile rose steadily, heading down range when suddenly the motor cut off and fell silent. The missile plunged downward. A dull explosion shook the ground a few kilometers away. That was the end. That night the walls of the [House Duindigt] cracked and collapsed, burning bright in the New Year.


Source: Heinz Krings, Wir schossen nach London , from the magazine Frankfurter Illustrierte, Frankfurt a.M., 15 October 1950, no. 21


JANUARY

   At the beginning of the New Year, in an attempt to increase his command stature, General Kammler renamed all of the rocket units. Battalion 485 became the Artillery Regiment z.V.902. Battalion 836 became the Artillery Regiment z.V.901. The SS Werfer Battery 500 became the SS Werfer Abteilung 500. The Training and Experimental Battery 444 became Lehr und Versuchs Abteilung z.V. However, the Table of Organization, which upgraded the V-2 battalions to regiments, was not finalized until February; and even then, it was nothing more than a restructure on paper. In the middle of January, the experimental grounds at Heidekraut were evacuated. The Russian advance, along with the dwindling supply of experimental rockets, prevented any further test shots. After a short stay in the frigid, snow-covered woods at Wolgast, the remnants of the Heidekraut organization disbanded near the Weser at Rethen.

   On January 1, 1945, the Luftwaffe launched Operation Bodenplatte, a major air operation against Allied airfields in the Low Countries. Hundreds of German aircraft attacked Allied airfields, destroying or severely damaging some 465 aircraft. However, the Luftwaffe lost 277 planes, 62 to fighters and 172 to the unexpectedly high number of Antwerp X flak guns, which unbeknownst to the Germans, had been set up to protect against incoming flying bombs. The loss of considerable amounts of aircraft on each side was more devastating to the Luftwaffe, as it could not replace the valuable material and pilots. However, the destruction of British aircraft of the Second Tactical Air Force was a blessing for the V-2 firing crews. During January, the number of fighter-bombers over The Hague was reduced for almost four weeks while the RAF struggled to replace the lost aircraft.

   Across the English Channel on January 5, 1945, London was subjected to a severe pounding. During a 24-hour period, the V-2 batteries in The Hague had fired 21 rounds. The same day, Allied fighter-bombers were out hunting targets of opportunity. A railway shipment of B-stoff (alcohol) was attacked between the Dutch cities of Hengelo and Enschede, which resulted in the loss of one rail tanker. Several days later, on January 13, 1945, 22 missiles were launched from The Hague. On January 25, a missile was fired at 8:17 AM from the grounds of Duindigt. It came down at the Archipel area on the corner of Riouxstraat-Bonistraat, completely destroying five houses with forty more Dutch houses heavily damaged.
Ten persons were killed with forty more injured. On January 26, 1945, at 11:45 PM a rocket fired by 1./485 malfunctioned and came down in The Hague at Brandstraat, but did not explode. Parts from the engine were strewn across Stephensonstraat and Laan van Meerdervoort. By the end of January, the average daily number of missiles launched from the coast of the Netherlands had reached its highest point.

   Due to the increased activity of the rocket crews, there were more unsuspecting victims of out-of-control rockets. Arthur van t Sant lived with his mother at Thorbecklaan. He was twelve at that time, but he remembers watching the German trucks go by as they pulled the liquid-oxygen bowsers along the roads Loosduinseweg to Haagweg in Loosduinen. One of his most stunning memories was when a V-2 launched from the area of Ockenburgh malfunctioned and came down near his home on January 1, 1945. The rocket was fired by the 1./485 from Vliegveld Ockenburgh around 5:17 PM. Arthur was looking out through his window and witnessed the rocket rising. Just after leaving the launch table, the rocket turned 160 degrees. It then flipped and flew out of control in Arthur s direction. Arthur hid himself behind a big trunk, hoping it might provide some sort of protection. The V-2 flew under fierce fire horizontally over his house, blasting over two cemeteries, and came down at Indigostraat, on the corner of Kamperfoeliestraat, setting dozens of houses on fire, some two miles from where it was launched. A tremendous boom was heard across the city, which signaled the destruction of many Dutch houses. Local doctors and nurses, who were very quickly on scene to provide first aid to the injured, could not begin their work until German soldiers recovered the scattered remains of the rocket. Half an hour had elapsed before the local fire brigade was allowed into the area. According to police reports, 24 people were killed and many others wounded.

   Over the next dew days, V-2s were observed operating from Monsterscheweg and the Ockenburgh estate grounds. The launching site at the Bloemendaal Foundation had been moved to the main road of Monsterscheweg. All residents between Monsterscheweg and Maeweg had been evacuated. On January 15, a rocket fired by 1./485, around 1:13 PM, exploded on the launching table. Twenty minutes later the warhead detonated. Later, various trucks were seen moving from the explosion site in the direction of the estate house






SCENES OF DEVASTATION FOLLOWING THE INDIGOSTRAAT INCIDENT

   We were always listening to hear if the rocket sounded strange, because if something sounded wrong, crashes happened quite often, said Van t Sant. We had a clear view over the Notenplein and behind that was Rozenburg, a mental hospital. We called it the Gekken Huis (madhouse). Behind Rozenburg was Loosduinen and further on, Bloemendaal and Ockenburgh, which had an airfield before the war. A few days after the Indigostraat incident a V-2 fired from Bloemendaal exploded in the air almost immediately after launch. Eight greenhouses at Plaats Langeveld in Monster were decimated. The air pressure had blown some completely flat, while the rest sustained heavy glass damage. Bloemendaal was almost completely destroyed by the Allied bombing raids and crashing V-2s. During daylight hours we could see fragments of houses blown into the sky when British Typhoons and Spitfires bombed and strafed the launch site area, said Van t Sant.

   Faulty rockets exploded in mid-air or in ground explosions. In many cases, these misfires fell in the unoccupied Sperrgebiet, but not all. The rocket crews observed many tail fires shortly after liftoff. The technical personnel examined the debris and reported they frequently detected wadded pieces of paper packed inside the propellant tanks and the turbo pump. Many of these failures were the direct result of sabotage during the manufacturing of the rockets. It is estimated that sixty local residents died as a result of misfire incidents close to the launching locations and although official German documentation does not mention it, Dutch locals alleged that many more rocket troopers perished as a consequence of rocket failures and those events were never reported.

   On January 16, 1945, the German civil authorities in The Hague made a request to the commander of the V-2 troops asking for the cessation of missile launches from within the city. They said, Even for the German troops, the crashes caused useless suffering. The German commander, Colonel Hohmann, replied, All failures were the fault of the Dutch people, because it was only by Dutch sabotage that a V-2 could fail. Rocket battery commanders appreciated The Hague s advantages. There was plenty of effective camouflage to protect against the RAF. For fear of causing too many civilian casualties, the Germans believed the RAF placed restrictions on the RAF when attacking rocket targets in densely populated areas. Only days later, January 25, 1945, a V-2 launched from Duindigt came down in the Archipelago quarter behind the corner Riouwstraat and Borneostraat destroying five houses. A giant crater was ripped behind the row of houses leaving their interiors exposed in the debris.

   The fear of espionage and the smuggling of the rocket secrets prompted the Germans introduce strict security measures. Curious people who collected the crashed pieces of the V-2 usually had to pay with their lives. Several people were executed because they picked up a silly piece of scrap metal from a V-2 crash site. In The Hague and its surrounding areas, announcements on yellow paper were posted in numerous locations starting in December. It was forbidden to enter the areas where the rockets crashed or to remove any material found at a crash location, Persons who violate these regulations will be immediately executed. This was not an empty threat, as experienced by five agricultural workers on January 9, who out of curiosity, happened upon V-2 wreckage near Hoek van Holland. The workers saw a rocket come down at Kapittelland and went to see what was going on, after which they were discovered by approaching German soldiers. They were immediately arrested and taken to the command post at Marlot. The next morning they were taken to Duindigt and shot with submachine guns. One of the victims, Flip van den Berg, was only wounded in his side, but was left for dead. He managed to crawl away later and survived.

   From Plaats Langeveld the Dutch residents easily could see and hear the V-2 launches at Bloemendaal. V-2s were seen waiting under the trees on the roads of the complex and were also reported in front of the administration building of the Bloemendaal Foundation. Rockets were seen entering the Ockenburgh estate grounds as well and driving onto the nearby Madesteyn estate. A launch would be preceded by the arrival and positioning of tracked vehicles mounting anti-aircraft guns in the fields surrounding the launching site. Each had a crew of about six to eight men. Near the grounds of the psychiatric clinic and campus, there were nine or more firing sites.

   The launch sites were very simple located on roads or sometimes on reinforced paths, and were usually spaced at 50-100 yard intervals. Trees provided natural camouflage. A peculiar fact noticed was that most of the firing points had no slit trenches or vehicle shelters anywhere nearby. The whole area was pitted with craters from the failed rockets, which fell back, in some cases almost directly on the firing points. A V-2 rocket crashed in the sandy dunes of the nearby area known as Solleveld, resulting in a significant and deep crater that remains visible and intact to this day, serving as a reminder of that historic event.
This crater is now located in the Duingebied Solleveld nature preserve and may not be accessible to the public.



ABOVE: V-2 FAILURE AND CRASH AT RIOUWSTRAAT

RAF 2ND PERIOD

   On January 10, 1945, No. 603 Squadron RAF, who previously had been flying Beaufighter s, reassembled at RAF Coltishall and took over the Spitfires of No. 229 Squadron RAF. Some of the No. 229 pilots were also incorporated into No. 603. Subsequent to a few days of bad weather, the RAF conducted a major operation in The Hague on February 3, 1945, involving 63 Spitfires from No. 453 Squadron, No. 603 Squadron (No. 229), and the No. 602 Squadron along with two photoreconnaissance Mustangs from No. 26 Squadron. Intelligence reports indicated that the tramway sheds near the WSM depot at Loosduinen were used by the rocket troops as a filling point for liquid-oxygen. The target was believed by the British to be a liquid-oxygen manufacturing location, which was incorrect it served only as a parking aera for the fuelling detachment and included facilities for vehicle maintenance and storage. From the sky above, the hum of Merlin engines was heard as five to six Spitfires tipped over side by side and came in to attack. The aircraft made two runs at Langenhorst and Loosduinen, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Other targets included the Haagse Bos and Hoek van Holland.

   On February 9, 1945, No. 453 Squadron RAAF and No. 603 (229) Squadron mounted another attack on the WSM depot at Loosduinen. By then, V-2 operations at Ockenburgh had ceased, and the German sentries had disappeared. The WSM depot was suspected as being a liquid-oxygen factory. At 2:25 PM, twenty-two Spitfires bombarded the location with hits on the northern part of the target and many near misses on surrounding buildings. The bombardment destroyed the blacksmith shop, the locomotive workshop, and the work sheds. Two locomotives were badly damaged. After the bombing, a bright flash of light, orange plumes, blue smoke, and numerous explosions were observed.

   Most raids produced poor results, as was the case during the raid of January 5, 1945, at Bloemendaal, when V-2 crews simply moved to another site and fired a rocket 30 minutes after the raid. That day rockets were launched from the estate of Madesteyn, between Maeweg and Monsterscheweg. The following day, the crews used firing sites situated near the villa at Ockenburgh, and in front of the wasserette at the Bloemendaal Foundation building. The launch site was later moved back from Ockenburgh to the vicinity of the summer homes, and finally a site next to the Ockenburgh kliniek hospital was utilized.
Owing to the many days of inclement weather, it seems the V-2 crews were not particularly hindered by the air attacks. They were able to conduct their daily operations, while taking the usual precautions, on an almost uninterrupted schedule. Nevertheless, the Coltishall Wing s No. 602 and No. 603 squadrons RAF posed the biggest threat to the rocket troops. Both units were equipped with the new Spitfire Mark XVIs. No. 602 pilot Raymond Baxter was excited by the performance of the new variant and said he loved the Mark XVI from the word go.

   Baxter described the typical dive-bombing attack flying the Spitfire Mk. XVI, It was a close formation exercise and we bombed in sections of four or more, and if you were leading, you flew over the target, and you would round your wing and count two and roll on your back and come down like that. Every aeroplane would do the same thing. So, ideally, it was a stream of four aeroplanes very close together. You bombed individually, but obviously you didn t drop your bombs until the leader pulled away and that was the trick to make it successful. It all depended on how good the leader was. The dive itself was always 70 to 75 . Ideally, you would start at 8,000 feet, drop the bombs at 3,000 feet and then pull out. The load was one 500 pound bomb under the main fuselage and two 250 pound bombs, one under each wing.

   The Spitfire XVIs, which burned almost one gallon-per-minute of fuel, were fitted with centerline drop tanks in order to operate from Norwich. The extra fuel was required for the return flight to England. The drawback, due to the drop tank, they were only able to carry two 250-pound bombs, one on each wing. However, once captured airfields on the continent like Ursel, Heimond, and Maldegem became available, the squadrons could fly south from The Hague to recover. Since the drop tanks were no longer needed, another 500-pound bomb could be carried under the aircraft. While the Spitfires were refueled and rearmed, the pilots took a short break at Ursel for pee and tea. Once more, they flew to The Hague dropping another 1,000 pounds of bombs, before returning to England. From January 1945, the primary targets were the storage depots, railway sidings, and road bridges. Many of the attacks in February were mounted against the heavily wooded area of the Haagse Bos.















   P
   PHOTOS ABOVE: SCENES OF DESTRUCTION IN THE HAGUE
   CAUSED BY CRASHING ROCKETS OR RAF ATTACKS

   On January 28, 1945, the Training and Experimental Battery 444 withdrew from The Hague and traveled to a new testing range, which was planned in the area of Buddenhagen near Peenem nde. Prior to the movement, the men of Battery 444 were aware of the pending withdrawl and felt a bit disheartened about it. Not so much because they were being pulled from combat duties, but rather for strictly material reasons: They expected their new rations would be worse than the plentiful supplies for soldiers at the front. Near Peenem nde, a fresh series of improved V-2s were scheduled to be tested. The plan was for the battery to conduct test launches using the Leitstrahl guidance sytem. However, most likely due to the advance of the Soviets, Battery 444 withdrew from the Peenem nde area in early February. After January, there is little information in official records concerning the whereabouts and makeup of Battery 444 a portion of the unit s war diaries were burned in the closing days of the war to prevent capture.

   Arriving in The Hague at the end of January were the first and third platoons of the 3./485, which had replaced Battery 444. As a result, two rocket batteries, 1./485 and 3./485, remained in The Hague to continue operations. The new troops launched their first attacks right away, which allowed the campaign to proceed nearly uninterrupted. Since their new assignment in Buddenhagen did not require a significant portion of the operating equipment, a large portion of Battery 444 s vehicles and equipment remained in place. The platoons from 3./485 moved into the existing Battery 444 launch sites and occupied their vacated quarters. Nothing significantly changed for the technical and supply troops because of this operational exchange.

   In the days prior to February 2, 1945, a firing site was located in the garden of Zorgvliet. After February 2, a new firing site was set up at the corner of Statenplein and Willem de Zwijgerlaan, followed by another site at Jacob Catslaan and Johan de Wittlaan. A rocket launched by 3./485 at Duindigt failed, and came down near De Battaaf, raining pieces of burning material down on city streets. In the months of January and February, the number of launches substantially increased. In the months of January and February, the number of launches substantially increased. Improved missile transportation from the Mittelwerk, more missiles becoming accessible from the testing sites as a result of Russian gains in Poland, and better weather in January all contributed to an increase in launches. On February 4, sixteen V-2s were fired in just 24 hours.


ABOVE: 1945 PHOTOS REVEAL RAF DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS AT BLOEMENDAAL
   To increase his command authority, SS General Kammler had already given all of the rocket units new names at the beginning of the New Year. Battalion 485 was designated as the Artillery Regiment z.V.902, and Battalion 836 became Artillery Regiment z.V.901. The SS Werfer Battery 500 became the SS Werfer Abteilung 500. The Training and Experimental Battery 444 became Lehr und Versuchs Abteilung z.V. Even then, this was merely reorganization on paper, as the Table of Organization, which promoted the V-2 battalions to regiments, was not approved until February 7, 1945. [For clarity, we will continue to refer to them here by their original designations.]

   The launching sites and Ockenburgh/Bloemendaal had been abandoned by the first week of February. Many of the rocket soldiers had already concluded that the war would soon end. After some of the men had been caught listening to the English radio broadcasts, they were ordered to turn in all of their personal radio sets. Even so, many soldiers kept their radios. Some of the soldiers approached Dutch residents seeking civilian clothes, indicating that they had already begun to contemplate Germany s defeat. The situation was even more desperate for the Dutch still living under German control.

   During the war, the western province of Holland was separated from the rest of the country, and there was very little food available during the winter. Children went many times to the launch areas asking the German rocket soldiers for food. In desperation, the population began eating things like sugar beets and tulip bulbs. Rita Winter would sneak out at night after curfew and steal vegetables from the small neighborhood gardens. On her way she could see the V-2s on trailers rolling down Vredeburgerweg. Because there was no gas or electricity in The Hague, people used anything that would burn for heating and cooking purposes. Behind the dunes, the Germans had fenced off and evacuated a wide part of the land. Civilians tried to get into these empty houses to remove all the wood

   Leaving Ockenburgh on the overcast afternoon of February 7, 1945, the first and second platoons of 1./485 occupied launch sites within the Sperrgebiet. A few weeks later the platoons of 1./485 were operating from the Statenkwartier, while the 3./485 launched from Duindigt. On February 9, it was reported that rockets were being launched from Stadhouderslaan 41, the Avenue of Trees, in front of the Gemeentemuseum. Rockets were fired from the roadway Kerkhoflaan and from the nearby camouflaged areas Zorgvliet and Scheveningse Bos (Scheveningen Forest). In Statenkwartier, V-2s were launched from the roadway Stadhouderslaan and later at the intersection Willem de Zwijgerlaan and Statenkwartier. On February 8, one platoon of the 2./485 took up the position at the Hoek van Holland and Staalduinse Bos.

   On February 12, the Resistance reported that a storage area for rockets was located in the tram sheds of the HTM, between Zwolsestraat and Haastenhoekweg. Transport trucks and Vidalwagen trailers were seen in the area. Only days before, 30 rail cars loaded with rockets arrived at Staatsspoor station. These were transfered to the Hollandsspoor and moved over the electric line to the Hofplein station at Scheveningen-Kurhaus for unloading. Additional fuels were stored in the garage on Oude Scheveningsche (Scheveningseweg) Road 61 and 62, where all trucks and tankers filled up. Next to the garage was the command post building for material-supply.
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   According to the Resistance, Meillerwagen trailers were commonly parked at the intersection of Scheveningseweg and the pathway into Zorgvliet. The report also claimed that the Germans had taken possession of the Vios garage in Wateringen (Plein 32-36b) and utilized it as a temporary storage facility for V-2s; however, this claim is dubious given that the garage could only accommodate vehicle storage.

   On February 21, 1945, Rita Winter s mother was called from her home in Rijswijk to the German Headquarters in The Hague, which was situated in the Hotel des Indes and was Dutch headquarters for the Wehrmacht High Command. When she arrived, she did not want to leave her children unattended. She told Rita to take her brother Frans and walk over to the Paleis Lange Voorhout (the Royal Palace Lange Voorhout, a public building). As they were waiting at the entrance, they noticed the Allied fighters in the skies above. This was not so unusual. Rita relaxed on a bench just outside the doorway as her little brother stood looking at the Spitfires above. Suddenly they each noticed a whistling sound. Frans turned toward his sister and asked, What is that? Before she could answer, a huge explosion ripped across the front of the building.

  
The Spitfires of No. 602 Squadron flew 28 sorties over The Hague that day. Their primary targets were the V-2 areas in the Haagse Bos. Coming in low, the aircraft bombed and strafed the entire length of the wooded city park. The Lange Voorhout was another tree-lined area situated in the neighborhood past the edge of the Haagse Bos, and apparently, one of the RAF pilots had missed or mistaken his target. The explosion of the 250-pound bomb tore open young Frans s stomach, and the life poured out of him. The remains of another young girl, who had also been sitting on the bench, were splattered in his hair and on Rita. Dazed, but not too seriously hurt, Rita held her little brother tightly, but he died a few hours later. It seemed to Rita that during this period, there was no real safe place in The Hague.


   Indeed, after a prolonged period of bad weather, the RAF launched a massive effort over The Hague on the days of February 21-22, 1945. Days of overcast skies and inclimate weather had kept the RAF grounded, and when the weather finally cleared, huge numbers of fighters were ordered over The Hague. The aircraft circled the city for hours, dive-bombing and strafing the length of the woodland launching sites with machine gun and cannon fire. In many cases, the aircraft descended to deck level. Wassenaar, Duindigt, the Haagse Bos, Clingendael (Filmstad), Loosduinen, Hoek van Holland, and the villa at Ockenburgh were the major objectives of the Spitfires.

   On February 21 several No. 602 Squadron Spitfires had just finished a bombing run somewhere over Wassenaar when a V-2 was launched in front of them from the forest. One of the pilots attempted to attack the fast moving rocket, but was unable to hit it.
RAF pilot F/L Raymond Frederick Baxter remembers:

   ...I read in my log book that we attacked a target just North above The Hague. I must have been in a very aggressive mood because I read that after a dive attack of 6,000 feet, I ordered the boys to return to attack the anti-aircraft defense, which had been trying to make it difficult for us. After we rolled back in, I saw to my surprise at a distance of 600 meters a V-2 lifting out of the forest that we had just bombed rising into the air, very slowly right in front of us. It was an incredible sight and it was so unexpected that I could not do anything about it. But, my number three, a Scotchman called Cupid Love, responded very fast and shot at the V-2 as it passed through his gun sight. It must have been one of the most optimistic shots of the entire war. As far as I know this was the only time in history of the war that a dive-bomber attacked an airborne rocket. Fortunately, he didn t hit the damn thing. I say fortunately, because if he d it blown up, the war would have ended quite abruptly for me.

   Official records, both German and English, support the fact of this incident happening on February 21, 1945. The war diaries of 485 indicate launches occurring at 12:49 PM and 16:20 PM, fired by platoons from 3./485 at Duindigt. Hand-written notes described Spitfires that were engaged by the battery s anti-aircraft unit and that many enemy fighter-bombers were in the area. Both pilots, Love and Baxter, were noted as flying on February 21 in the squadron s operational records book.

  
The following day, February 22, 1945, the Filmstad at Clingendael/Oosterbeek was the subject of the RAF s attention. The Spitfires of No. 453 Squadron RAAF, carried out six armed reconnaissance sorties over The Hague. Due to bad weather, the first sortie was aborted, but the second flight, which had 12 aircraft, dive-bombed the Filmstad with each plane dropping two 250-pound bombs. 18 bombs were dropped on the complex, and the pilots noted that they hit buildings with very good result and one very large explosion was observed from the easternmost building. After an 85-minute flight, all of the aircraft made a safe return to RAF Swannington in Norfolk at 12:15 PM. After three more sorties that day, a number of pilots reported, huge fires, burning ferociously.

   Fires raged over the northern portion of the Haagse Bos, and near House Ten Bosch. While the interior of the large film halls burned, a great smoke plume rose over Wassenaar, extending in the sky as far as Leiden. Shortly after the raid, pilots of No. 602 Squadron, who were attacking nearby targets, observed this towering column of smoke. The pilots were highly impressed with the results achieved by the Australian pilots, which eradicated the last traces of the former Film City.

-PILOTS FROM NO. 602 SQUADRON RAF OVER
DUNIDIGT, HAAGSE BOS, AND THE FILMSTAD


   On this same day, Spitfires also attacked the launch sites at Hoek van Holland. Over the next few days and weeks, the launching positions of the platoon from 2./485 were repeatedly attacked by fighter-bombers. During the final five days of February, hundreds more RAF attacks were made on the northern portion of the Haagse Bos and Duindigt. Evidently, there was some degree of success, as only one rocket was launched on February 24, 1945, and none were launched on February 25.







PHOTOS ABOVE: FLORA HALLE AT RIJNDBURG


   However, on February 25 tanker trucks and rocket trailers were seen entering the Ursula Clinic in Wassenaar through the entrance off Houtlaan. Double sentries manned the perimeter of the area at night, and the entry from the main road was totally blocked off and obscured. On February 26, the launches at Duindigt resumed from new positions a little further to the west, on the opposite side of the racetrack. Vehicles coming from Rust en Vreugd and the Voorlinden estate assisted these launches. In the first two months of 1945, Allied aircraft carried out 1,143 missions against V-2 targets, releasing 216 tons of bombs.

   After the destruction of the Filmstad, the two portions of the 5./91 Technical Battery moved to a new location at Flora Halle in Rijnsburg on February 26, 1945. Post Flora was a large flower market and auction hall located on the southeast outskirts of Rijnsburg, north of the launching areas. As with the Filmstad, the brightly lit auction hall created a large and open environment where troops could conduct their operations without interruption. On February 27, German forces successfully captured control of the surrounding houses and other structures. In the following hours, around 25 supply trucks made their way to Flora. Shortly after, several rockets were transported on Vidalwagen trailers.

   On February 24, during a period of low activity due to the lack of liquid-oxygen, another portion of the V-2 technical battery had moved to the previously mentioned Ford Halle (Ford CAB) garage on Gevers Deynootstraat near the electric railroad in Scheveningen. Here the large and spacious building of the former EMS power station provided the opportunity to mount the warheads and lift the rockets onto Meillerwagens.

   German materials were also stored in the nearby Kurhaus parking garage and the many sheds of the HTM street trams.
By March 1, 1945, the rocket transports from Alphen arrived at Leiden at night. They were concealed under the large platform canopy at Leiden Centraal Station on rail cars. The V-2s were offloaded as necessary, and they were subsequently moved to the technical batteries before being towed to the launching sites in the environs. As many as 30 rail cars continued to be positioned at the station and remained ready to transport rockets, even during this late stage of the ongoing conflict. The commitment to maintaining their operational status highlights the strategic importance of these resources to the German crews.









DESTRUCTION OF THE FILMSTAD (FILM CITY) OOSTERBEEK

DUINDIGT ESTATE

   Walter Jochems inherited the centuries-old Duindigt estate from his father in 1902. He and his wife lived on the country estate, but kept a house in The Hague for the winter months. Jochems and his wife undertook major renovations of the large estate. Many outbuildings near to the house, such as the coach house and the stables, were demolished. Mr. Jochems was a passionate driver, so later he built a large garage. A larger, grander house replaced the old white villa in 1931. The previous greenhouses and an orchard located nearby were cleared.

   The large moat near the house was partially filled in, resulting in a larger forecourt for the house. In addition, ornamental ponds with ducks were added, as well as new rock and decorative gardens. Old coppice trees surrounded the new house and soon new trees were added to the property. A new deer park replaced the old stables, and llamas roamed the meadow next to Benoordenhoutseweg.

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RENBAAN DUINDIGT

   Before the war, people in Wassenaar were familiar with the strange scene of exotic animals at Duindigt, particularly the llamas. When war broke out a handful of llamas remained behind with the red deer, but most of the flock was evacuated to several farms in the polders. As the soldiers of Battery 444 (later 3./485) walked the grounds of Duindigt, they quickly became familiar with a few of the more beligerant llamas, which would run and chase after the soldiers. Later, it was noticed that the number of animals observed grazing on the Duindigt estate was decreasing, especially the deer. The farm s animals were used to supplement the increasingly scanty and erratic supplies of food and milk for the V-2 troops.


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            HOUSE DUINDIGT PRIOR TO THE WAR

   The Duindigt estate s grounds remained a favored location for V-2 crews, with activity there reaching its peak in February 1945. On February 15, several firing sites were positioned near the racetrack grandstands at Duindigt, directly across Wittenburgerweg on the track itself, and behind a house on Buurtweg. House Duindigt was destroyed earlier, by a failure on New Year s Eve 1944. The Germans made extensive use of the estate from November through February, largely because the area offered multiple sites well suited to V-2 crew operations. These varied settings provided the space and conditions necessary for logistics, coordination, and the effective execution of launches.

   When a particular launching platform was damaged by RAF bombs or crashing V-2s, they would simply move to another spot, sometimes only yards away.
Duindigt had approximately 30 launching sites available, which were strategically situated either within the expansive grounds of the estate itself or at the nearby Renbaan racecourse track, providing convenient access for use.

   The Dutch Resistance had reported that trucks and vehicles for the rocket troops were parked at Rust en Vreugdlaan, at the entrance Houtlaan, and also at Buurtweg. The supply of rockets was very close with a temporary store located in the woods of Bosje van Ravelijn just to the north of Duindigt. Inside of one week, over seventy V-2s were fired at London, with as many as 50 percent of them hitting greater London

   Reconnaissance flights were frequently conducted over the launch sites. On February 26, 1945, photo interpreter C.B. Reynolds was on duty at RAF Medmenham in Buckinghamshire, England, when he noticed something peculiar in the most recent photographs over Duindigt. On a small lane between the racecourse and the estate, a V-2 was upright on the launch stand between two Meillerwagens. A further 2,000 meters away, adjacent to the dune strip, three rockets were visible resting on trailers under the trees of the Ravelijn woods at Voorlinden.

   The German troops boasted the Voorlinden estate would be safe from any potential bombing threats, as it was owned by Hugo Loudon, who served as an envoy to London. They believed that his diplomatic status would ensure the protection of his valuable and extensive collection of antique porcelain artifacts that were housed within the estate. However, this was not true. Loudon, one of the co-founders of the energy giant Royal Dutch/Shell Oil, had died in The Hague in 1941.






























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PHOTOS ABOVE: DUINDIGT ESTATE BEFORE AND AFTER THE WAR
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BELOW: MODERN PHOTOS OF GUIDED TOUR OF THE DUINDIGT ESTATE GROUNDS.
DUINDIGT IS PRIVATE FAMILY-OWNED PROPERTY NO TRESPASSING!










































BOMBING OF BEZUIDENHOUT, MARCH 3, 1945


   On March 3, 1945, sixty-one medium bombers forty-nine B-25 Mitchell and twelve DB-7 Bostons flew to the Dutch coast intending to bomb Duindigt and portions of the Haagse Bos where many V-2s were reportedly stored. The 137 Wing and 139 Wing of No 2 Group of 2nd TAF carried out the attack. The 137 Wing was stationed at Vitry-en-Artois Air Base (near Arras in northern France), and the 139 Wing was based at Melsbroek (northeast of Brussels). Because the V-2 targets were primarily in wooded areas, Allied commanders believed a low-level medium bomber attack could be carried out without risking too many civilian casualties. However, because of a navigation mistake, the first bombs were dropped over civilian areas at Bezuidenhout, southeast of the Haagse Bos instead of northwest a deviation of almost a mile from the target.

   At that moment, Rita Winter was standing behind a church in a cemetery with her mother and aunt. The funeral for little Frans Winter was concluding. As he was lowered into the ground, the drone of the bombers over Bezuidenhout echoed through the graveyard. The earth under their feet started to shake as the bombs began to fall in the distance. In a short time, the entire Bezuidenhoutkwartier, the civilian housing southeast of the Haagse Bos, was set ablaze. Firemen from all over The Hague, Vlaardingen, Schiedam, Rotterdam, and Utrecht en Zaandam battled to extinguish the fires all afternoon and evening. There were an insufficient amount of fire engines and firefighters, as many of the men had already been called up for the Arbeitseinsatz (forced labor conscription) or had gone into hiding. This left the blaze mainly unchecked.



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ACTUAL FILM FOOTAGE, BOMBING OF BEZUIDENHOUT, MARCH 3, 1945___
   That night, as the fires still blazed, several rockets rose into the smoke-filled skies, launched from Duindigt in the north. The Germans wanted to let the Allies know that they had missed their target once again. Shortly after 2:00 AM in the morning, five firefighters were killed when one of these rockets came down at Vlierweg near the Schenkweg, on the edge of the Bezuidenhout. On Sunday, the damage was clear:  3,315 houses were burned out entirely, mainly at Thersiastraat and Juliana van Stolberglaan and in the surroundings of Korte Voorhout; 1,217 houses were heavily damaged; 511 civilians were killed; and about 12,000 people lost their homes and all their possessions. The heavy bombardment was intended to completely destroy everything within a predetermined area. The inhabitants of The Hague were the ones who suffered the most as a result, not the rocket troops. Two targets had been chosen, however an inexperienced 137 Wing intelligence officer mixed up the coordinates, which altered one of the target locations. The coordinates were swapped so that the aiming point for the 137 Wing was located at the junction of Schenkstraat and Louise de Colignylaan in the middle of the Bezuidenhout.

   Even though the target area was obscured by clouds, the pilots releashed their bombs on cue of the lead aircraft, in violation of RAF regulations for low-level bombing. In addition, the aircrews of the 137 Wing could not see anything through the cloud deck and released their bombs using instruments. The mission should have been terminated if the target was not visible.

   The Dutch Resistance newspaper Trouw responded to the bombings at Bezuidenhout with this mournful editorial: The horrors of the war are increasing. We have seen the fires in The Hague after the terrible bombings directed at the V-2 launch sites. The war s tribulations have come down on us with their full impact once we saw the column of smoke flowing to the south. We could hear the bombs screaming as they detonated over Bezuidenhout, and the missiles that brought death and sorrow dropped only a hundred meters away from us. We watched as the V-2 rocketed into the air and roared, holding our breath to see if it would succeed or if it would crash into the homes of innocent civilians. It is horrible to see these monsters take off in the middle of the night between the houses, lighting up the skies. Now that The Hague is a frontline town and has been regularly bombed for more than ten days, one can only fathom the terrors that await us. Buildings, burning and smouldering furiously, a town choking from smoke, women and children fleeing, men hauling furniture which they tried to rescue from the chaos. What misery, what distress.

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IMAGES ABOVE SHOW THE BOMBING AND SUBSEQUENT AFTERMATH IN BEZUIDENHOUT ON MARCH 3, 1945 THESE PHOTOS SHOW THE DESTRUCTION AND RECOVERY EFFORTS THAT FOLLOWED



   German propaganda agencies swiftly and efficiently spread the news concerning the recent British attack, ensuring that the information reached a vast audience in a timely manner. The English government expressed regret and pledged to conduct a thorough inquiry; however, the findings of that investigation were never made public. The 2nd TAF abstained from further operations in The Hague, but Fighter Command went back to work. The racetrack at Duindigt became the focal point of the fighter-bomber strikes, as the RAF relentlessly pounded the launching points during the following week. The vast estate and adjoining racetrack were bombed nearly every day by diving Spitfires, but on March 9, 1945, the target took a particularly heavy beating. Throughout the day, there were times when so many bombs were dropped that the whole target area was hidden by clouds of smoke and dust. Platoons from Battery 3./485 reported that two Fiat SPA TM 40 tractors and another Breda tractor were destroyed. Following several weeks of constant and unyielding bombardment, the crews operating the V-2 rockets ultimately made the difficult decision to abandon the Duindigt site. This choice was precipitated by the nearly impassable condition of the country roads, which had been severely cratered and damaged, making movement increasingly challenging.

   A few days later, when the first Dutchmen entered the estate grounds, they were shocked to see the total devastation. The previously magnificent estate was no longer there. The many exploding rockets, the blast effect from each launch and then finally, around 230 RAF bombs had done a thorough job of obliteration across the grounds of the estate. Beech trees that were 200 years old were broken like twigs. Everything had been reduced to a barren wasteland with deep craters and trees scattered everywhere. The two large manor houses, the farm, and five additional modest homes were all in ruins. Thirteen hundred oaks, beech trees, and chestnuts were lost. The enormous craters left behind by falling rockets were much larger than the RAF bomb craters. Some of these craters measured 30 meters in diameter and 8-10 meters deep. British and American officers who had previously examined other V-2 launching sites came to Duindigt a few weeks after Germany s surrender. They were left in a state of shock as they observed the widespread destruction of the majestic oak trees, which had stood tall for generations, being brutally annihilated by the impact of falling missiles and the relentless barrage of RAF bombs.

   Also in March, the substantial structure of St. Egbertus Church in Hoek van Holland was obliterated by a rocket failure. The V-2 ended up striking in the midst of the cemetery, only fifty meters from the church. The rocket impact dug a huge crater gravestone fragments and bones from ripped coffins were shrewn about only fifty meters from the church. During the period of the rocket campaign at Hoek van Holland, fourteen rockets crashed prematurely in or on the outskirts of the village. The failed rocket launches that occurred in Hoek van Holland resulted in substantial damage to the surrounding area, with shattered glass littering the streets and intruding into every house within range of the explosions. The force of the blasts was so strong that it left many residents shaken and fearful for their safety. Fortunately, in a stroke of luck, there were no civilian casualties reported, thanks to the timely and complete evacuation of the entire fortress area prior to the incident.


   As of March 16, 1945, the 3./91 technical troops, were now re-positioned in Voorschoten at Duivenvoorde castle. The baron of the castle, along with all the members of his household staff, found themselves with no other choice but to leave the safety and relative comfort of the castle walls. Especially, when an electrical connection was established, linking the castle directly to the existing Veurseweg tramway lines, allowing for access to the local electrical grid. The vehicles and workshops of the V-2 technical crews drove beneath the canopy at Duivenvoorde, while some necessary supplies were moved over from Flora Halle and temporarily kept in garages along Veurseweg. The 3./91 soldiers were billeted in the castle and in the houses along Veurseweg. Previously, for a brief period in September 1944, Castle Duivenvoorde had already served as the Batterie 444 s command post. Because it had not been utilized since, the RAF did not view it as a high priority target. After being under the threat of constant aerial bombardment for the past several months, it was now a relief for the technical troops to move further away from the air attacks that were occurring near to the launch sites. They were happy to be relocating to a safer, more secure area.

   The final days of the V-2 campaign in The Hague became ones of abandonment, with a last few spiteful missiles being fired from makeshift locations or open roadways. Battery 3./485, which had been operating from Duindigt and the racecourse, moved to the Statenkwartier firing positions, and to a new launch site on the western side of the Haagse Bos. The technical position of 5./91 remained at the Flora Halle at Rijnsburg, while the warhead assembly and Meillerwagen installation continued to take place at the Ford Halle in Scheveningen, close to the electric train line. On March 17, a new firing location was positioned between the villas on the estate of Groot Hazebroek in Wassenaar.
The firing crews of 3./485 made their way onto the grounds of the estate. They accessed the property by passing through the primary entrance gate. This occurred during the latter part of the afternoon. Some hours later, specifically, a rocket was launched by these same firing crews. The launch took place not long after the hour of 10:00 PM that evening. However, these new sites did not last long.











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                                                  SIX-STORY BATAAFSCHE IMPORT MAATSCHAPPIJ (BIM) BUILDING IN THE HAGUE

   On March 18, 1945, six Spitfires from No. 602 Squadron attacked the six-story Bataafsche Import Maatschappij (BIM) building in The Hague. The large and imposing Shell-Mex building, known locally as the Royal Dutch Shell or BIM Building, was situated near St. Paschalis Baylonkerk church on Wassenaarseweg. The structure had been used by a variety of different German groups during the occupation, but in 1945, it was believed to be the headquarters for the V-2 department in charge of the radio technology used for guiding or tracking rockets. No. 602 Squadron pilot Raymond Baxter and his squadron leader Max Sutherland participated in the daytime raid on March 18.

   Prior to the mission Max Sutherland commented, The width of the building equals the total wing span of five Spitfires in close formation, so we can take it out. Flying in at low-level, 100 ft and at 400 mph, presented a more dangerous mission, as the many anti-aircraft guns in the Sperrgebiet would be waiting for the aircraft to come into their gun sights. For this reason, No. 453 Squadron RAAF would dive bomb as a diversion, while 602 pilots came in flat and low. Baxter recounted the mission years later; We flattened out at about 100 feet, coming in with the target dead ahead and square in our sights, at a range of about 300 yards.
We let go with 20 mm cannon and machine guns and then released our bombs."